{"id":578,"date":"2021-01-28T11:32:53","date_gmt":"2021-01-28T11:32:53","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.commoncause.org\/north-carolina\/articles\/building-democracy-2-0-the-dark-secret-of-majority-voting\/"},"modified":"2021-01-28T11:32:53","modified_gmt":"2021-01-28T11:32:53","slug":"construyendo-la-democracia-2-0-el-oscuro-secreto-de-la-votacion-por-mayoria","status":"publish","type":"article","link":"https:\/\/www.commoncause.org\/north-carolina\/es\/articles\/building-democracy-2-0-the-dark-secret-of-majority-voting\/","title":{"rendered":"Construyendo la democracia 2.0: el oscuro secreto de la votaci\u00f3n por mayor\u00eda"},"template":"","class_list":["post-578","article","type-article","status-publish","hentry","article_type-blog-post"],"acf":{"details":{"summary":"This is part 9 in a multi-part series examining ways to build an inclusive democracy for the 21st century.","featured_image":null,"article_type":162,"authors":["{\"site_id\":\"68\",\"post_type\":\"person\",\"post_id\":555}"],"related_issues":[109,417],"related_work":false,"location":null},"sidebar":{"helper_enable_sidebar":false,"helper_media_contact":{"heading":"Media Contact","manually_enter_person":false,"person":null,"name":"","role":"","phone":"","email":""},"helper_links_downloads":{"heading":"Links & Downloads","links":null}},"page_layout":[{"acf_fc_layout":"layout_wysiwyg","_acfe_flexible_toggle":null,"component_wysiwyg":{"content":"Introduction<\/strong>\r\n\r\nThis essay examines the electoral system we know best: \u00a0the single round simple majority system.\u00a0 This system became widespread in England during the 18th<\/sup> century through efforts to ensure members of Parliament represented roughly equal populations rather than variably sized communities.\u00a0 England exported it to the American colonies prior to the Revolution.\u00a0 On its face, this system seems like the most obvious and logical.\u00a0 In a single round simple majority system, there is only one round of voting, and the candidate who receives the most votes wins. \u00a0However, we will see that our electoral system, which has such intuitive appeal on its face, harbors a darker side.\u00a0 Operationally, the majority system presupposes two rivals vying for a seat.\u00a0 But voters often want more than two choices, and in many cases more than two candidates appear on a ballot.\u00a0 This essay will explain what happens to social behaviors in a democratic system when more than two candidates run for a single office.\u00a0 These behaviors provide important context for understanding the profound challenges to democracy to be explored later.\r\n\r\nTypes of Majority Voting Systems<\/strong>\r\n\r\nAs noted, majority voting systems are straight forward.\u00a0 In the American system of single round simple majority voting, voters receive a ballot with a list of names for each office and have one vote for each office. The candidate who receives the most votes for each wins.\u00a0 In other words, the winning candidate does not have to receive an absolute majority or 50% +1 of the votes to prevail.\u00a0 Receipt of a plurality or simple majority is sufficient.\u00a0 This system is known as a \u201cwinner-take-all\u201d or \u201cfirst-past-the-post\u201d system. \u00a0These descriptions refer to the fact that any candidate or party that receives one vote less than the winner receives no seats in the legislature.\u00a0 \u00a0In addition to the U.S., most of the British Commonwealth and nations with a legacy of British colonization employ the simple majority system.\u00a0 Of the 213 countries surveyed in the Electoral System Design Handbook, approximately 22% use a first-past-the-post or winner-take-all system.\r\n\r\nMulti-Member Districts<\/strong>\r\n\r\nThere are a range of majority voting systems in addition to the single round simple majority system.\u00a0 While this essay will focus on simple majority voting, it is helpful to have a familiarity with these other systems for comparative purposes and for evaluating electoral reforms later. Other types of majority systems have either single member districts like the U.S. or multi-member districts (e.g., a district with more than one seat on the same ballot).\u00a0 Systems with multi-member districts use the Block Vote (BV) and Party Block Vote (PBV) systems.\u00a0 With a BV system, voters receive a ballot with a list of seats and candidates.\u00a0 Voters have as many votes to use as there are seats in a district (e.g., five votes in a district with five seats to fill).\u00a0 In most BV systems, voters can vote for individual candidates regardless of party.\u00a0 Candidates with a simple majority prevail.\u00a0 With a PBV system, each party puts up a slate of candidates in a multi-member district.\u00a0 Voters have one vote.\u00a0 The party which receives the most votes wins all of the seats in that district.\r\n\r\nMulti-Round Voting<\/strong>\r\n\r\nSystems with single member districts tend to use the Alternative Vote (AV) system or the Two Round System (TRS).\u00a0 Both of these approaches seek to address the challenge posed by multiple candidates or parties appearing on a ballot for one office. \u00a0With the AV system, voters rank the candidates according to preference.\u00a0 This allows voters to express their views among candidates rather than only their top choice.\u00a0 Electoral system designers typically refer to this system as \u201cpreferential voting.\u201d\u00a0 In the U.S., it is called \u201cranked choice voting,\u201d and it is gaining support in the reform community.\u00a0 If a candidate receives more than 50% of the vote in the first round, the candidate wins. \u00a0\u00a0If no candidate receives an absolute majority of the vote, then the candidate receiving the fewest votes is eliminated and the second preference of that candidate\u2019s voters are counted.\u00a0 This process is repeated until a candidate receives an absolute majority of the votes.\u00a0 Australia, Fiji and Papua New Guinea use this system.\u00a0 It is also used for the presidential election in the Republic of Ireland.\r\n\r\nTRS represents another type of voting system used in single member districts.\u00a0 Like AV, TRS provides a mechanism that winnows the field of candidates so that one candidate can achieve an absolute majority of votes.\u00a0 TRS culls the number of candidates in the first-round election so that the top two vote getters (or some specified number of candidates) go on to a second round of voting. \u00a0The second election typically occurs within a week or so of the first.\u00a0 In the second round, the candidate who receives the most votes is declared the winner.\u00a0 France uses TRS in its legislature, and many countries with a legacy of French colonization employ it.\u00a0 In addition, a number of countries use TRS for the direct election of a president.\u00a0 Some states in the U.S. are now using TRS.\u00a0 Here, the system is called a nonpartisan \u201cblanket primary\u201d or \u201cjungle primary.\u201d\u00a0 California and Washington State use it for some elected offices other than presidential primaries.\u00a0 Alaska has instituted it beginning in 2022 with the top four candidates passing from a first-round primary to a second-round general election, which will use ranked choice voting.\r\n\r\nDuverger\u2019s Law<\/strong>\r\n\r\nAs noted, this essay will focus on the single round simple majority system used in the U.S. \u00a0The distinguishing feature of this system is its effect on political parties.\u00a0 A simple majority system tends to generate and sustain a two-party system.\u00a0 Maurice Duverger first detected this aspect of our electoral system in Political Parties<\/u> published in 1951.\u00a0 He wrote:\r\n

The simple-majority single-ballot system favours the two-party system.\u00a0 Of all the hypotheses that have been defined in this book, this approaches the most nearly perhaps to a true sociological law.\u00a0 An almost complete correlation is observable between the simple-majority single-ballot system and the two-party system:\u00a0 dualist countries use the simple majority vote and simple-majority vote countries are dualist.\u00a0 The exceptions are very rare and can generally be explained as the result of special conditions.<\/p>\r\nPolitical scientists now refer to this phenomenon as \u201cDuverger\u2019s Law.\u201d\u00a0 Prior to Duverger, theorists and pundits asserted a wide variety of theories to explain why the U.S. and nations of the British Commonwealth tended toward two-party systems.\u00a0 Some pointed to \u201cthe genius of the Anglo-Saxon peoples\u201d or \u201cthe temperament of the Latin races.\u201d\u00a0 Spanish diplomat and historian, Salvador de Madariaga, connected the two-party system \u201cwith the sporting instincts of the British people, which lead them to view political campaigns as a match between rival teams.\u201d\u00a0 At least this latter theory aptly describes the behavior of parties and politicians operating within a two-party system, and we will return later to the interplay between national identity and majority voting. \u00a0Otherwise, these theories failed to consider the role electoral systems play in driving the behavior that Duverger described through his empirical research.\r\n\r\nIn retrospect, the answer seems obvious.\u00a0 Duverger identified a \u201cpsychological factor\u201d that explains why simple majority voting produces a two-party system:\r\n

In cases where there are three parties operating under the simple majority single ballot system, the electors soon realize that their votes are wasted if they continue to give them to the third party:\u00a0 whence their natural tendency to transfer their vote to the less evil of its two adversaries in order to prevent the success of the greater evil.\u00a0 This \u2018polarization\u2019 effect works to the detriment of a new party so long as it is the weakest party but is turned against the less favoured of its older rivals as soon as the new party outstrips it.<\/p>\r\nThis \u201cpsychological factor\u201d explains why third parties struggle to compete in a winner-take-all voting system.\u00a0 Great Britain offers one of the best examples.\u00a0 Recall that many European countries adopted proportional voting systems in the early 20th<\/sup> century as liberal parties saw the threat posed by socialist or worker parties.\u00a0 Liberal parties found it hard to sustain efforts at coordinating with these new parties to avoid splitting the vote and handing conservative parties a victory.\u00a0 In response, liberal parties pushed for proportional voting, which allowed them to continue to win seats \u2013 even if their number of seats diminished.\u00a0 In contrast, the Liberal Party in Great Britain resisted proportional voting.\u00a0 It tried to convince its voter base to stick with it rather than siding with an ascending Labour Party.\u00a0 That strategy worked for several election cycles, but finally in 1918, the Liberal Party suffered a devastating loss of seats.\u00a0 That proved to be the tipping point.\u00a0 After that election, the Labour Party replaced the Liberal Party in a two-party system.\u00a0 It was too late for the Liberal Party to institute proportional voting.\u00a0 Members of the Labour Party no longer needed or wanted to change the electoral system once it replaced the Liberal Party as the second major party in a two-party system.\r\n\r\nThe U.S. has seen Duverger\u2019s Law at work throughout the nation\u2019s history.\u00a0 The Progressive Party, Independent Party, Reform Party, Green Party and Libertarian Party, among many others, have taken a run at creating a viable third party.\u00a0 Sometimes these parties gain traction and threaten to challenge one of the two major parties.\u00a0 However, these upstarts inevitably fail for the reason cited by Duverger.\u00a0 Voters ultimately realize that a vote for their preferred third-party candidate will risk handing the election to the party they dread most.\u00a0 Rather than risk such an outcome, voters default to the least objectionable alternative with the greatest chance of winning.\u00a0 This \u201cpsychological factor\u201d provides a built-in bias for America\u2019s two-party system.\r\n\r\nThe only instance a third party replaced one of the two major parties occurred in the 1850s.\u00a0 At that time, the Whig Party and Democratic Party competed for power.\u00a0 The Whig Party arose in the early 1830s when powerful members of the U.S. Senate came together to blunt Andrew Jackson\u2019s aggressive use of executive authority.\u00a0 William Harrison and Zachary Taylor won the presidency as Whigs in 1840 and 1848, respectively.\u00a0 Whigs favored an activist economic agenda, protecting domestic industries with tariffs, spending on infrastructure and establishing a national bank as well as protecting minorities, modernizing industry and promoting meritocracy.\u00a0 They opposed militarist expansion to the west and a strong executive branch.\u00a0 Whigs drew support from urban professionals, social reformers, and planters. \u00a0They had little support among poor farmers and unskilled workers.\r\n\r\nDespite its detailed agenda, the Whig Party struggled to articulate a clear message on slavery.\u00a0 In particular, the Party equivocated on the expansion of slavery to new states, which ultimately led to major losses in the 1852 election.\u00a0 Thereafter, the Whig Party hemorrhaged supporters to two fledgling parties: the Know Nothing Party and the Republican Party.\u00a0 Both of these parties claimed to be the heir to the Whig Party by opposing a powerful executive branch.\u00a0 However, the Know Nothings also raised concerns about mass immigration, while the Republican Party opposed the expansion of slavery to new states. The issue of slavery cost the Republican Party in the South, but the issue proved more salient to voters than immigration.\u00a0 In the 1856 election, Democrat James Buchanan won the presidential election with 45% of the vote while the Republican and Know Nothing Parties split the remaining vote with 33% and 22%, respectively.\u00a0 After the 1856 election, the Republican Party emerged as the second major party in the U.S.\u00a0 as members of the Know Nothing Party realized that by splitting the vote, they were only aiding the Democrats.\u00a0 From that point forward, the U.S. has experienced the unyielding dominance of two major parties, acquiescing to the power of Duverger\u2019s Law.\r\n\r\nParticipation<\/strong>\r\n\r\nAs described in the last essay, Rousseau set forth a framework for democracy that demands certain attributes of an electoral system in order to reveal the will of the people.\u00a0 That framework includes participation, formation of majorities, shifting coalitions, equality and choice. These attributes or characteristics make for a healthy democracy.\u00a0 By several measures, the American system performs well.\u00a0 The simplicity of the system encourages participation.\u00a0 Voting for one candidate for each office on a ballot is simple to follow.\u00a0 In comparison to other electoral systems, our system is one of the easiest for voters to understand.\u00a0 The fact this system arose prior to most others in place today speaks to its intuitive appeal.\r\n\r\nFormation of Majorities<\/strong>\r\n\r\nIn addition to its simplicity, our system encourages the formation of majorities by facilitating the creation of majority-run governments.\u00a0 This happens almost by definition in a winner-take-all, two-party system.\u00a0 The party that wins the most seats has a majority when there is only one other major party.\u00a0 This aspect of the simple majority system comes close to Rousseau\u2019s vision that the \u201cgeneral will produces law.\u201d\u00a0 Of course, our Founding Fathers put in place protections to prevent a majority government from abusing minority interests.\u00a0 Federalism continues to place substantial authority with the states. \u00a0The separation of powers creates checks and balance among the various branches of government.\u00a0 One party may control the House while another controls the Senate or the Executive Branch. These safeguards do not betray the logic of a majority voting system \u2013 just an acknowledgement of its awesome power to translate the will of the people into law.\u00a0 In this sense, the simple majority system speaks to the principle that elections have consequences.\r\n\r\nShifting Coalitions<\/strong>\r\n\r\nIn addition to the formation of majorities, the American voting system tends to encourage shifting coalitions.\u00a0 This feature is critical to prevent one faction from becoming entrenched to the detriment of other interests.\u00a0 The U.S. has experienced the ascendance of one party over several election cycles.\u00a0 The Democratic and Republican Parties have both enjoyed periods of sustained dominance.\u00a0 The Democratic Party prevailed in the early 19th<\/sup> century.\u00a0 The Republican Party dominated in the latter half of the 19th<\/sup> century.\u00a0 This pattern has repeated in the 20th<\/sup> century.\u00a0 Just in the last 12 years, both the Democratic Party and the Republic Party have controlled the presidency and both chambers of Congress, albeit briefly. \u00a0It is very difficult for major parties to create a permanent majority because electoral success requires them to forge unstable coalitions comprised of disparate interests.\u00a0 Holding those coalitions together over multiple election cycles is impossible.\r\n\r\nThroughout American history, we have seen certain constants:\u00a0 groups motivated by immigration, trade and protectionism, meritocracy, modernization, limited government, etc. While some issues remain constant, the external forces animating those issues change over time.\u00a0 In addition, demographics evolve and voters respond differently to external events.\u00a0 A coalition partner one election cycle may become a mortal enemy several cycles later.\u00a0 Witness the movement of working class voters \u2013 a mainstay of the Democratic Party from the 1930s through the 1970s \u2013 to the Republican Party in recent decades.\u00a0 Groups that had no political identity such as evangelicals have emerged, through the cultivation of partisans, to become critical voting blocs.\u00a0 The instability our two-party system imposes on majority formation provides a healthy incentive for parties to engage voters and work actively to attract and maintain new supporters.\u00a0 As a result, this system has kept our democracy vibrant.\r\n\r\nEquality<\/strong>\r\n\r\nThe simple majority system falls short of Rousseau\u2019s concept of democracy in two important areas:\u00a0 equality and choice.\u00a0 Our system leads to the unequal treatment of voters in a couple of important ways.\u00a0 First, a winner-take-all system can shut the interests of a minority out of government.\u00a0 Any candidate or party that fails to garner a majority of votes has zero representation in government \u2013 even if that candidate or party achieves near parity with the winner.\u00a0 This outcome would not be so dire if the principle of shifting coalitions manifested at all levels of government.\u00a0 However, governments at the state and local level can experience dominance by one party for years if not decades.\u00a0 We know from the term \u201cbattleground states\u201d how few states fall into this category.\u00a0 For all those states that do not, one party tends to dominate election cycle after election cycle.\u00a0 As a result, supporters of the minority party in these states have no voice in government.\r\n\r\nAnother aspect where majority systems fall short on equality is the concept of \u201cwasted\u201d votes or votes that exceed the number needed to win an election.\u00a0 Wasted votes in a majority system can dramatically skew the translation of votes into seats won. The most familiar example of this concept is the practice of gerrymandering.\u00a0 This practice allows a party in control of redistricting to manipulate the boundaries of districts to assist that party in winning more seats than that reflected in the votes of an election.\u00a0 For example, after redistricting in 1992, the Democrats in North Carolina received about 50% of the statewide vote but won over 90% of the state senate seats.\u00a0 Likewise, after redistricting in 2012, the Republicans won nearly 70% of the state senate seats while only receiving 50% of the statewide vote.\u00a0 Jonathan Rodden\u2019s Why Cities Lose<\/u> provides ample data showing how wasted votes systematically rob urban-based parties of seats in state legislatures.\u00a0 The concentration of voters in urban areas means that an urban based party will win a few seats by overwhelming margins while the even distribution of voters in suburban and rural areas allows another party to win many more seats by smaller margins.\u00a0 In sum, wasted votes in majority systems amplify the voice of some voters and dilute the voice of others.\r\n\r\nChoice<\/strong>\r\n\r\nChoice poses another disadvantage for majority systems \u2013 the major disadvantage.\u00a0 This is ironic because majority systems seek to provide voters with a decisive choice resulting in a majority government that can enact new laws.\u00a0 In reality, majority voting undermines choice in the following ways: \u00a0the outcome of an election sometimes does not reflect the choice of a majority of voters, minority candidates are often not presented as a choice, and most significantly, voters choose \u201cstrategically\u201d rather than based on preference, which distorts the election outcome and produces negative feedback loops such as polarization.\u00a0 The subtle and not so subtle erosion of choice by the majority system reveals its dark side.\r\n\r\nCondorcet\u2019s Criterion<\/strong>\r\n\r\nAs shown by Duverger\u2019s Law, majority voting produces two-party systems.\u00a0 However, many voters desire alternatives to the choices presented by the major parties.\u00a0 And when a ballot contains more than two choices, it can lead to outcomes inconsistent with a majority of voters\u2019 preferred choice.\u00a0 Nicolas de Condorcet, a French mathematician and philosopher, identified the problem in his Essay on the Application to the Probability of Majority Decisions<\/u> in 1785. In it, he showed that majority preferences can become intransitive when three or more options are presented.\u00a0 In other words, a majority of voters could prefer candidate A over B, B over C and C over A.\u00a0 This is known as Condorcet\u2019s paradox.\u00a0 He argued that it can only be solved when one candidate wins all pair-wise elections between all candidates in an election, known as Condorcet\u2019s criterion.\u00a0 Of course, there is no mechanism in our voting system for this to occur.\r\n\r\nA more common problem occurs when a third-party candidate drains votes from the major party candidates.\u00a0 This happens frequently in presidential elections.\u00a0 Just in the last 40 years, we saw John Anderson get 6.6% of the vote in 1980.\u00a0 Ross Perot received nearly 19% of the vote in 1992.\u00a0 Ralph Nader garnered almost 3% of the vote in the 2000 election.\u00a0 In that election, 537 votes separated the two major party candidates in the State of Florida.\u00a0 Many speculated that Nader\u2019s candidacy cost Vice President Gore the election in Florida and, therefore, the presidency. \u00a0While it is impossible to know if any of these third-party candidacies affected the outcome, they expose the impact third parties have in a majority system.\u00a0 At a minimum, it can cast a shadow on the legitimacy of the winner.\r\n\r\nCondorcet\u2019s criterion has caused political scientists to devise different types of voting systems to ensure the outcome of an election aligns with a majority of voters.\u00a0 The AV system and TRS described above are designed so that voters can express their first preference while preserving the ability to choose a lower ranked choice once multiple candidates are winnowed from the field.\u00a0 Beyond the AV system and TRS, political scientists have devised many more such systems, including the Borda method, to meet the Condorcet criterion.\u00a0 Mathematical modeling shows that all of them can lead to different outcomes.\u00a0 In Liberalism Against Populism<\/u>, William Ryker remarks on the challenge faced by all variants of the majority system:\r\n

Unfortunately, there is no fair way to ensure that there will be exactly two alternatives.\u00a0 Usually the political world offers many options, which, for simple majority decision, must be reduced to two.\u00a0 But usually also the way<\/u> the reduction occurs determines which two will be decided between.\u00a0 There are many methods to reduce the many to two; but, as has long been obvious to politicians, none<\/u> of these methods is particularly fair because their different ethical principles cannot be effectively ordered and, worse still, because all<\/u> methods can be rigged.<\/p>\r\nWhat Condorcet identified over two centuries ago holds true today.\u00a0 Majority voting systems have no perfect formula to ensure the winner represents a majority of voters when more than two candidates are running.\r\n\r\nAdherents of social choice theory defend majority systems despite the problem of translating individual preferences into social ones.\u00a0 Ryker notes:\r\n

Since social decisions are not, in liberal [or Madisonian] theory, required to mean anything, liberals can cheerfully acknowledge that elections do not necessarily or even usually reveal popular will.\u00a0 All elections do or have to do is to permit people to get rid of rulers\u2026.\u00a0 The liberal purpose is then accomplished, even though one could not make a coherent ideological statement about what these voters did and even though their majority might be cyclical.<\/p>\r\nFrom this perspective, all that matters is the system allows voters to defeat bad rulers.\u00a0 This may be easier to do in a two-party system.\u00a0 After an election, the losing party can position itself as the loyal opposition, critiquing the majority until the next election occurs.\u00a0 Since the majority party has complete charge of the legislature, it is responsible for the actions it takes.\u00a0 At the next election, it must justify reelection based on its actions.\u00a0 This winner-take-all aspect of majority systems can make it easier to remove bad governments than other systems. This argument has some merit, but we will see later that more serious threats to the viability of democracy exist in today\u2019s environment than merely the removal of bad governments.\r\n\r\nRepresentation by Minorities and Women<\/strong>\r\n\r\nThe simple majority voting system also tends to diminish the representation by women and minorities in legislative bodies.\u00a0 For this reason, it unnecessarily limits choice.\u00a0 As noted, Duverger\u2019s Law says that simple majority voting produces two-party systems.\u00a0 To compete, the major parties must constantly increase and maintain coalitions of disparate groups.\u00a0\u00a0 That means nominating candidates perceived as broadly acceptable to those disparate groups.\u00a0 The \u201cmost broadly acceptable candidate\u201d syndrome can discourage parties from selecting women and minorities as candidates in two-party systems.\u00a0 Strong evidence described in the Electoral System Design Handbook shows that racial and ethnic minorities fair worse in winner-take-all voting systems as reflected in their numbers in legislatures.\u00a0 Also, studies have found that other voting systems such as proportional ones have twice as many women holding elected office compared to majority systems. \u00a0By favoring the selection of candidates who appeal to the lowest common denominator (e.g., a male voter who would not vote for a female candidate), the two-party system can exacerbate structural biases.\u00a0 This feature of our system may be one reason a woman has not yet reached our highest office despite the continued advances made by women in many fields.\u00a0 In sum, by disadvantaging certain groups from competing politically, majority systems unduly limit choice.\r\n\r\nDistorting Choice<\/strong>\r\n\r\nLastly, the American electoral system distorts the way voters express their choice in an election.\u00a0 Because of the spoiler effect from third-party candidates, voters intuitively recognize the need to support a candidate with the best chance of winning to avoid \u201csplitting the vote\u201d and handing the election to an offensive alternative. That does not mean that voters must always hold their nose at the polls.\u00a0 Many times, a voter\u2019s preferred candidate is also one of the major candidates.\u00a0 However, Duverger\u2019s Law says the spoiler affect tends to polarize the electorate, placing the focus of campaigns on the negative aspects of the opposition.\u00a0 Campaign consultants like to say, \u201cEveryone hates negative advertising, but negative advertising works!\u201d\u00a0 It works because telling voters why they should hate the alternative enhances the chances they will vote for the least offensive alternative rather than a preferred alternative who could \u201csplit the vote.\u201d\r\n\r\nPart IV of the essays will look more closely at polarization.\u00a0 For purposes of electoral systems, it is important to note that majority systems fall short on choice for a simple reason:\u00a0 voters lack freedom to express their choice when it is exercised strategically.\u00a0 A choice made based on preference has greater value than a choice based on fear of ticket splitting.\u00a0 Recall the discussion of the collective brain.\u00a0 Democracy taps the power of a population expressing diverse and independent opinions based on decentralized information.\u00a0 An electoral system that forces voters to choose strategically based on the lesser of two evils rather than the independent judgment of the voter diminishes the power of the collective brain. This effect distorts the way governments are formed and hence the priorities a government places on public goods.\u00a0 This means the actions of government do not reflect the will of the people.\u00a0 Therefore, strategic voting encouraged by majority voting compromises a fundamental aspect of Rousseau\u2019s notion of the general will.\r\n\r\nThe Dark Secret of Majority Voting<\/strong>\r\n\r\nMajority voting arose out of a simple, intuitive idea about collective decision making.\u00a0 The candidate with the most votes wins.\u00a0 When enough candidates in a two-party system win an election to form a majority government, this electoral system can produce laws reflective of the will of the people.\u00a0 In this sense, Rousseau would be pleased with a majority system.\u00a0 However, there is a defect buried deep within the single round simple majority system.\u00a0 Structurally, it presumes only two candidates are running for a seat.\u00a0 But elections do not work like that.\u00a0 Voters often desire multiple candidates representing a range of views, and ballots often list more than two options.\u00a0 When more than two candidates appear on the ballot for one seat, the American system falters.\u00a0 Voters must adjust to the ramifications of ticket splitting, which can lead to a repugnant outcome.\u00a0 In response, voters gravitate toward two camps \u2013 two major parties most likely to assemble a disparate coalition that can defeat the opposition.\u00a0 This psychological effect identified by Duverger can become a detriment to democracy:\u00a0 in the way it treats voters unequally and in the way it undermines choice.\u00a0 And we will see later that, under certain conditions, it can be fatal to democracy.\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\nMack Paul is a member of the state advisory board of Common Cause NC and a founding partner of Morningstar Law Group.<\/em>\r\n\r\nParts in this series:\r\n\r\nIntroduction: Building Democracy 2.0<\/a>\r\n\r\nPart 1: What Is Democracy and Why Is It Important?<\/a>\r\n\r\nPart 2: How the Idea of Freedom Makes the First Innovation Possible<\/a>\r\n\r\nPart 3: The Second Innovation that Gave Rise to Modern Democracy<\/a>\r\n\r\nPart 4: The Rise and Function of Political Parties \u2013 Setting the Record Straight<\/a>\r\n\r\nPart 5: How Political Parties Turned Conflict into a Productive Force<\/a>\r\n\r\nPart 6: Parties and the Challenge of Voter Engagement<\/a>\r\n\r\nPart 7: The Progressive Movement and the Decline of Parties in America<\/a>\r\n\r\nPart 8: Rousseau and \u2018the Will of the People\u2019<\/a>\r\n\r\nPart 9: The Dark Secret of Majority\u00a0Voting<\/a>\r\n\r\nPart 10: The Promise of Proportional\u00a0Voting<\/a>\r\n\r\nPart 11: Majorities, Minorities and Innovation in Electoral\u00a0Design<\/a>\r\n\r\nPart 12: The Misdirected Attempts at Electoral Reform in\u00a0the\u00a0U.S.<\/a>\r\n\r\nPart 13: Building Democracy 2.0: The Uses and Abuses of Redistricting in American Democracy<\/a>"}}]},"yoast_head":"\nBuilding Democracy 2.0: The Dark Secret of Majority Voting - 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