{"id":11937,"date":"2021-10-28T10:22:07","date_gmt":"2021-10-28T14:22:07","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.commoncause.org\/resources\/as-a-matter-of-fact-the-harms-caused-by-election-disinformation-report\/"},"modified":"2024-06-13T19:53:54","modified_gmt":"2024-06-13T23:53:54","slug":"en-fait-les-dommages-causes-par-le-rapport-de-desinformation-electorale","status":"publish","type":"resource","link":"https:\/\/www.commoncause.org\/fr\/resources\/as-a-matter-of-fact-the-harms-caused-by-election-disinformation-report\/","title":{"rendered":"En fait : le rapport sur les dommages caus\u00e9s par la d\u00e9sinformation \u00e9lectorale"},"template":"","class_list":["post-11937","resource","type-resource","status-publish","hentry","resource_type-report"],"acf":{"details":{"summary":"Donald Trump\u2019s Big Lie is working, and we have to respond. Just as we came together last year, rising up to vote safely and securely in record numbers during a global pandemic, we must now rise up to stop election disinformation efforts in future elections.","featured_image":"","resource_type":150,"authors":"","related_issues":[133,2065,2066,110],"related_work":false,"location":46},"sidebar":{"helper_enable_sidebar":false,"helper_media_contact":{"heading":"Media Contact","manually_enter_person":false,"person":"","name":"","role":"","phone":"","email":""},"helper_links_downloads":{"heading":"Links & Downloads","links":null}},"page_layout":[{"acf_fc_layout":"layout_wysiwyg","_acfe_flexible_toggle":"","component_wysiwyg":{"content":"<h2>Introduction<\/h2>"}},{"acf_fc_layout":"layout_wysiwyg","_acfe_flexible_toggle":"","component_wysiwyg":{"content":"<div class=\"page\" title=\"Page 7\">\r\n<div class=\"layoutArea\">\r\n<div class=\"column\">\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>En Am\u00e9rique, quelle que soit notre origine, notre couleur ou notre code postal, nous valorisons notre libert\u00e9.<\/strong> G\u00e9n\u00e9ration apr\u00e8s g\u00e9n\u00e9ration, nous nous sommes battus pour avoir notre mot \u00e0 dire dans les d\u00e9cisions qui ont un impact sur nos vies, pour avoir la libert\u00e9 de participer pleinement \u00e0 la vie de notre pays. Mais ces derni\u00e8res ann\u00e9es, une petite faction est devenue de plus en plus habile \u00e0 r\u00e9pandre des mensonges sur nos \u00e9lections, des mensonges qui ciblaient les communaut\u00e9s noires et d\u2019autres communaut\u00e9s de couleur pour les emp\u00eacher de voter. <strong>des mensonges qui ont aliment\u00e9 une attaque meurtri\u00e8re contre notre Capitole en janvier 2021 pour perturber le transfert pacifique du pouvoir, des mensonges qui menacent de supprimer les votes et de saper la confiance du public dans les futures \u00e9lections.<\/strong> Cette utilisation intentionnelle de fausses informations pour influencer la participation des \u00e9lecteurs aux \u00e9lections est connue sous le nom de \u00ab d\u00e9sinformation \u00e9lectorale \u00bb.\r\n<blockquote>Les \u00c9tats-Unis se trouvent \u00e0 un tournant d\u00e9cisif. Plus d\u2019un habitant am\u00e9ricain sur trois \u2013 et pr\u00e8s de 801 r\u00e9publicains \u2013 croient \u00e0 tort que le pr\u00e9sident Joe Biden n\u2019a pas l\u00e9gitimement remport\u00e9 l\u2019\u00e9lection.<\/blockquote>\r\nLes \u00c9tats-Unis se trouvent \u00e0 un tournant d\u00e9cisif. Plus d\u2019un habitant am\u00e9ricain sur trois \u2013 et pr\u00e8s de 801 r\u00e9publicains \u2013 croient \u00e0 tort que le pr\u00e9sident Joe Biden n\u2019a pas l\u00e9gitimement remport\u00e9 l\u2019\u00e9lection, et une majorit\u00e9 d\u00e9clare ne pas avoir confiance dans le fait que les \u00e9lections refl\u00e8tent la volont\u00e9 du peuple. <strong>Le grand mensonge de Donald Trump fonctionne, et nous devons r\u00e9agir. Tout comme nous nous sommes rassembl\u00e9s l\u2019ann\u00e9e derni\u00e8re pour voter en toute s\u00e9curit\u00e9 en nombre record pendant une pand\u00e9mie mondiale, nous devons maintenant nous mobiliser pour mettre un terme aux efforts de d\u00e9sinformation \u00e9lectorale lors des prochaines \u00e9lections.<\/strong> Ce rapport est un plan de jeu pour r\u00e9ussir.\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<div class=\"layoutArea\">\r\n\r\nAs online election disinformation has increased, Common Cause Education Fund\u2019s commitment to monitoring and stopping it has likewise increased. As part of our plan to combat election disinformation, Common Cause Education Fund has prepared this report to explain the problem of election disinformation in detail and propose commonsense public and corporate policy reforms to reduce the harmful impacts of election disinformation in future elections. The report\u2019s final section is a series of state, federal and corporate reforms to help stem the flow of election disinformation that is undermining Americans' faith in the nation\u2019s elections. Reform recommendations detailed in the report include the following:\r\n<ul>\r\n \t<li><strong>Les r\u00e9seaux sociaux doivent renforcer leurs politiques de lutte contre les contenus destin\u00e9s \u00e0 porter atteinte \u00e0 notre d\u00e9mocratie<\/strong>, notamment en fournissant aux utilisateurs des informations faisant autorit\u00e9 concernant le vote et les \u00e9lections, en r\u00e9duisant la propagation et l\u2019amplification de la d\u00e9sinformation \u00e9lectorale et en offrant une plus grande transparence concernant leurs politiques et pratiques de mod\u00e9ration de contenu.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Le Congr\u00e8s et les l\u00e9gislatures des \u00c9tats devraient modifier les lois sur le droit de vote pour explicitement <strong>interdire la diffusion intentionnelle de fausses informations concernant la date, le lieu ou le mode des \u00e9lections <\/strong>ou les qualifications ou restrictions relatives \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9ligibilit\u00e9 des \u00e9lecteurs, dans le but d\u2019emp\u00eacher le vote.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Le Congr\u00e8s et les l\u00e9gislatures des \u00c9tats devraient <strong>mettre \u00e0 jour les lois sur la divulgation du financement des campagnes \u00e9lectorales \u00e0 l&#039;\u00e8re num\u00e9rique<\/strong>, pour inclure <strong>\u00ab<\/strong>des clauses de non-responsabilit\u00e9 \u00ab pay\u00e9 par \u00bb sur la publicit\u00e9 num\u00e9rique et des dispositions efficaces mettant en lumi\u00e8re l\u2019argent transf\u00e9r\u00e9 entre les groupes pour \u00e9chapper \u00e0 la divulgation.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Le Congr\u00e8s et les l\u00e9gislatures des \u00c9tats devraient <strong>adopter une l\u00e9gislation compl\u00e8te sur la protection des donn\u00e9es <\/strong>pour prot\u00e9ger les consommateurs contre la collecte, l\u2019utilisation et le partage abusifs de donn\u00e9es personnelles.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Le Congr\u00e8s devrait<strong> promulguer une l\u00e9gislation renfor\u00e7ant les m\u00e9dias locaux <\/strong>et de prot\u00e9ger l\u2019acc\u00e8s du public \u00e0 des informations de qualit\u00e9 sur le gouvernement, la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 publique, la sant\u00e9 publique, le d\u00e9veloppement \u00e9conomique et la culture locale.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Le Congr\u00e8s devrait <strong>adopter une loi pour prot\u00e9ger l&#039;acc\u00e8s des chercheurs et des journalistes de surveillance aux donn\u00e9es des r\u00e9seaux sociaux<\/strong>, permettant aux chercheurs d\u2019\u00e9tudier les pratiques des plateformes de m\u00e9dias sociaux sans crainte d\u2019interf\u00e9rence ou de repr\u00e9sailles de la part des soci\u00e9t\u00e9s de m\u00e9dias sociaux.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Le Congr\u00e8s devrait <strong>adopter une loi interdisant les algorithmes discriminatoires des plateformes en ligne<\/strong> et de cr\u00e9er une plus grande transparence sur la mani\u00e8re dont ces algorithmes fonctionnent.<\/li>\r\n \t<li><strong>La Maison Blanche et les gouverneurs des \u00c9tats du pays doivent jouer un r\u00f4le de premier plan dans la lutte contre la d\u00e9sinformation \u00e9lectorale.<\/strong>, notamment en \u00e9mettant des d\u00e9crets ordonnant aux agences dot\u00e9es de pouvoirs d\u2019application de la loi, d\u2019\u00e9laboration de r\u00e8gles et d\u2019enqu\u00eate d\u2019utiliser ces capacit\u00e9s pour lutter contre la d\u00e9sinformation \u00e9lectorale.<\/li>\r\n<\/ul>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>"}},{"acf_fc_layout":"layout_wysiwyg","_acfe_flexible_toggle":"","component_wysiwyg":{"content":"<h2>Aper\u00e7u de la d\u00e9sinformation \u00e9lectorale<\/h2>"}},{"acf_fc_layout":"layout_wysiwyg","_acfe_flexible_toggle":"","component_wysiwyg":{"content":"<h2>Qu\u2019est-ce que la d\u00e9sinformation \u00e9lectorale ?<\/h2>\r\nDe mani\u00e8re g\u00e9n\u00e9rale, la d\u00e9sinformation \u00e9lectorale d\u00e9signe les tentatives intentionnelles d\u2019utiliser de fausses informations pour influencer la participation des \u00e9lecteurs aux \u00e9lections. Il existe une longue histoire de tactiques utilis\u00e9es pour priver les \u00e9lecteurs de leur droit de vote, et nos rapports pr\u00e9c\u00e9dents11 d\u00e9taillent comment les d\u00e9pliants, les panneaux d\u2019affichage et d\u2019autres tactiques hors ligne sont utilis\u00e9s pour transmettre aux \u00e9lecteurs des informations incorrectes qui pourraient les emp\u00eacher de participer \u00e0 une \u00e9lection. Ces rapports ont \u00e9galement mis en \u00e9vidence certaines des nouvelles tactiques num\u00e9riques en ligne utilis\u00e9es pour diffuser de la d\u00e9sinformation \u00e9lectorale, notamment le courrier \u00e9lectronique, le Web et Facebook, qui commen\u00e7aient tout juste \u00e0 gagner en popularit\u00e9 aupr\u00e8s du grand public.\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>\u00ab Trouble de l\u2019information \u00bb<\/strong> is an emerging term of art used by researchers and media experts that encompasses three related terms:\r\n\r\n\u2022 Disinformation is content that is false (even if it contains some truth) and deliberately created to harm a person, social group, organization, or country.\r\n\r\n\u2022 Misinformation is false information, but it is differentiated from disinformation by lacking an intent to harm any person, group, or organization.\r\n\r\n\u2022 Malinformation is content that is accurate but is intentionally manipulated to cause harm, including voter suppression or voter confusion.\r\n\r\n<strong>D\u00e9sinformation<\/strong>\r\n\r\nLa d\u00e9sinformation est une fausse information, mais elle se distingue de la d\u00e9sinformation par l\u2019absence d\u2019intention de nuire \u00e0 une personne, un groupe ou une organisation. Bien qu\u2019elle soit moins intentionnelle, elle peut \u00eatre tout aussi nuisible. Parmi les exemples de d\u00e9sinformation, on peut citer les inexactitudes dans les dates ou les statistiques ou les l\u00e9gendes de photos mal identifi\u00e9es. Toute personne confront\u00e9e \u00e0 la d\u00e9sinformation pourrait la croire et en tirer des conclusions, m\u00eame si le fournisseur de contenu n\u2019avait pas l\u2019intention de la d\u00e9sinformer.\r\n\r\n<strong>D\u00e9sinformation <\/strong>\r\n\r\nLe contenu de d\u00e9sinformation est faux et d\u00e9lib\u00e9r\u00e9ment cr\u00e9\u00e9 pour nuire \u00e0 une personne, un groupe social, une organisation ou un pays. La d\u00e9sinformation est d\u00e9lib\u00e9r\u00e9ment et souvent diffus\u00e9e de mani\u00e8re secr\u00e8te pour influencer l&#039;opinion publique et les actions, obscurcir ou modifier le vote ou susciter l&#039;indignation. La d\u00e9sinformation peut contenir des faits r\u00e9els, mais ces faits sont soit sortis de leur contexte, soit combin\u00e9s \u00e0 des mensonges pour cr\u00e9er et soutenir un message sp\u00e9cifique.\r\n\r\n<strong>Malinformation <\/strong>\r\n\r\nLa malinformation est un contenu qui est exact mais qui est intentionnellement manipul\u00e9 pour causer du tort. Cela comprend la d\u00e9formation du contexte d&#039;une information r\u00e9elle, le doxing (la divulgation en ligne d&#039;informations personnelles telles que l&#039;adresse et le num\u00e9ro de t\u00e9l\u00e9phone d&#039;une personne pour l&#039;intimider) ou la divulgation s\u00e9lective de correspondance.\r\n\r\n<strong>Qui diffuse la d\u00e9sinformation \u00e9lectorale et pourquoi ? <\/strong>\r\n\r\nFew who intentionally spread election disinformation would publicize this fact because the behavior is sometimes illegal and always despicable. The ability of individuals to anonymously spread election disinformation is part of the problem\u2014and strengthening transparency laws as recommended later in this report is part of the solution. Nevertheless, here is what we know about those spreading election disinformation in recent years. Both foreign and domestic actors have used\u2014and likely will continue to use\u2014election disinformation. During the 2016 elections, the Russian Internet Research Agency created numerous posts on multiple social media platforms. According to the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, this foreign interference was \u201cat the direction of the Kremlin\u201d and created social media content in support of then-candidate Trump and against Hillary Clinton. In particular, the content was \u201cprincipally aimed at African-Americans in key metropolitan areas.\u201d Russian disinformation efforts included the use of the Facebook page Blacktivist, which purported to be a Black empowerment page and garnered 11.2 million engagements with Facebook users. Both advertisement and organic (non-ad) content was published through this program. This Russian social media content was designed to drive divisions between voters and cause general political instability in the United States, a tactic that differed from more direct efforts to disenfranchise voters used by some other purveyors of election disinformation.\r\n\r\nA number of social scientists are working to understand the psychology behind individuals spreading disinformation. In our observations, gleaned from over 15,000 volunteer hours spent monitoring social media for mis- and disinformation during the 2020 election cycle, we have found that election misinformation is often spread by those sincerely attempting to be helpful in a climate of uncertainty and distrust (particularly when it came to the USPS and its ability to manage vote by mail in the 2020 elections) and disinformation is spread by individuals with partisan goals, including intraparty contests, like the Democratic Presidential Primary.\r\n\r\nIn an age of hyperpartisanship, spreading election disinformation can both serve to attack your political opponents and show that you are aligned with other members of your political tribe. Election disinformation\u2014in particular, the narrative of a rigged election and pervasive voter fraud committed by Democrats\u2014existed long before the rise of Donald Trump but now has become party orthodoxy. You can signal that you are a Trump-supporting \u201cMAGA Republican\u201d (an acronym for Trump\u2019s campaign slogan \u201cMake America Great Again\u201d) by spreading stories that reinforce a narrative (however false) about a political system rigged against other MAGA Republicans. This creates a negative feedback loop of distrust in government and elections: a September 2021 poll showed that 78% of Republicans believe that Joe Biden did not win the presidency. Numerous states and counties are proceeding with sham ballot reviews\u2014even in areas where Trump won decisively. Among 15 Republican candidates currently running for secretary of state in five battleground states, 10 have \u201ceither declared that the 2020 election was stolen or called for their state\u2019s results to be invalidated or further investigated.\u201d <strong>La d\u00e9sinformation \u00e9lectorale est diffus\u00e9e par les militants et les candidats de la m\u00eame mani\u00e8re que les messages politiques et les priorit\u00e9s des enjeux l\u2019\u00e9taient autrefois.<\/strong>"}},{"acf_fc_layout":"layout_wysiwyg","_acfe_flexible_toggle":"","component_wysiwyg":{"content":"<h2>Lois f\u00e9d\u00e9rales et nationales r\u00e9gissant la d\u00e9sinformation \u00e9lectorale<\/h2>"}},{"acf_fc_layout":"layout_wysiwyg","_acfe_flexible_toggle":"","component_wysiwyg":{"content":"Several different bodies of law provide tools for fighting election disinformation. A primary purpose of election disinformation is to suppress and sometimes intimidate voters. Consequently, election laws prohibiting voter intimidation and false election speech play an important role in fighting election disinformation. Several other bodies of law are also critically important to the fight. Strong campaign finance disclosure laws can shine the light of publicity on those seeking to undermine our elections from the shadows and help ensure existing laws are enforced. Communications laws, consumer protection laws, media literacy laws, and privacy laws can all play a part in effectively regulating and deterring election disinformation.\r\n\r\n<strong>Voter Intimidation and False Election Speech Laws <\/strong>\r\n\r\nFederal law and laws in nearly every state contain provisions explicitly prohibiting voter intimidation, with many of these laws being rightly interpreted as prohibiting election disinformation. Some states have enacted laws explicitly prohibiting various types of false election-related speech\u2014e.g., false statements about voting procedures\/qualifications, candidates, incumbency, endorsements, veteran status, or ballot measure effects. In this report, we focus only on the first of these types: laws prohibiting false statements about voting procedures and qualifications such as where and when to vote. Our reasons are twofold and related to one another. First, the veracity of statements about voting procedures and qualifications (e.g., the date of the election, the hours polls are open) is easily ascertainable, and determining such veracity can be done in an entirely nonpartisan, objective fashion. By contrast, determining the veracity of statements about a candidate (e.g., a candidate\u2019s stance on an issue) is often more subjective, as reflected by the rating systems some prominent fact-checkers use.\r\n\r\nSecond, and relatedly, courts have for years been divided on the constitutionality of laws prohibiting false speech characterizing candidates and ballot measures, with at least two federal appellate courts in recent years striking down such laws as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Courts are much more likely to uphold as constitutionally permissible narrower laws prohibiting false statements about the procedures and qualifications of voting.\r\n\r\n<em><strong>Federal Voter Intimidation and False Election Speech Laws<\/strong><\/em>\r\n\r\nThe following is a summary of voter intimidation and false speech laws at the federal level and in numerous states. And the recommendations section at the end of this report identifies the best features of these laws, urging their adoption throughout the United States.\r\n\r\n<strong>The National Voter Registration Act of 1993<\/strong> makes it a crime to knowingly and willfully intimidate or threaten any person for voting, registering to vote, or aiding others to register and vote. Another federal criminal statute similarly provides that \u201c[w]hoever intimidates, threatens, coerces, or attempts to intimidate, threaten, or coerce, any other person for the purpose of interfering with the right of such other person to vote\u201d in a federal election has committed a crime subject to fines or imprisonment. The DOJ explains that this statute \u201ccriminalizes conduct intended to force prospective voters to vote against their preferences, or refrain from voting, through activity reasonably calculated to instill some form of fear.\u201d Conspiracy to \u201cinjure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person\u2026in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States\u201d\u2014 including the right to vote\u2014is a felony under federal law. This criminal code provision covers voter suppression schemes, including \u201cproviding false information to the public\u2014or a particular segment of the public\u2014regarding the qualifications to vote, the consequences of voting in connection with citizenship status, the dates or qualifications for absentee voting, the date of an election, the hours for voting, or the correct voting precinct.\r\n\r\nIn addition to the federal criminal code provisions detailed in the preceding paragraphs, the <strong>Voting Rights Act of 1965 and other civil rights law<\/strong><strong>s<\/strong><strong>\u00a0<\/strong>also prohibit disinformation activities that amount to voter intimidation or suppression. The Voting Rights Act provides that no person \u201cshall intimidate, threaten, or coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any person for voting or attempting to vote.\u201d\r\n\r\n<em><strong>State Voter Intimidation and False Election Speech Laws<\/strong><\/em>\r\n\r\nThe federal laws detailed earlier prohibiting voter intimidation and suppression\u2014including some disinformation tactics\u2014generally apply to any election with candidates for federal office on the ballot. Nearly every state, likewise, has laws prohibiting voter intimidation and suppression, applicable to elections even when no federal office candidates are on the ballot. A few states have laws explicitly regulating false election-related speech, and a few others have interpreted more general anti-intimidation laws to prohibit false election speech. APPENDIX I in the report summarizes the voter intimidation and false speech laws of several states. Among the best state laws worthy of emulating around the nation, Colorado law provides that no person shall knowingly or recklessly \u201cmake, publish, broadcast, or circulate or cause to be made, published, broadcasted, or circulated\u2026any false statement designed to affect the vote on any issue submitted to the electors at any election or relating to any candidate for election to public office.\u201d The Colorado attorney general\u2019s guidance makes clear that disinformation tactics\u2014including \u201cmisleading phone calls, texts, or emails to a voter\u201d\u2014can constitute illegal voter intimidation.\u201d Similarly, Hawaii law provides that any person who \u201cknowingly broadcasts, televises, circulates, publishes, distributes, or otherwise communicates\u2026false information about the time, date, place, or means of voting with the purpose of impeding, preventing, or otherwise interfering with the free exercise of the elective franchise\u201d has committed illegal election fraud. And Virginia explicitly outlaws communicating to a \u201cregistered voter, by any means, false information, knowing the same to be false, intended to impede the voter in the exercise of his right to vote,\u201d including information \u201cabout the date, time, and place of the election, or the voter\u2019s precinct, polling place, or voter registration status, or the location of a voter satellite office or the office of the general registrar.\u201d Importantly, Virginia law includes a private right of action for registered voters to whom such false information is communicated, enabling them to seek an \u201cinjunction, restraining order, or other order, against the person communicating such false information.\u201d\r\n\r\nFor an overview of Campaign Finance Laws, Federal Communications Laws, Federal Consumer Protection Laws, State Media Literacy laws, and State Privacy Laws, read Section 2 of the full report."}},{"acf_fc_layout":"layout_wysiwyg","_acfe_flexible_toggle":"","component_wysiwyg":{"content":"<h2>S\u00e9lectionnez les politiques d&#039;int\u00e9grit\u00e9 civique des m\u00e9dias sociaux<\/h2>"}},{"acf_fc_layout":"layout_wysiwyg","_acfe_flexible_toggle":"","component_wysiwyg":{"content":"Social media platforms from Facebook to Twitter and YouTube to TikTok have civic integrity policies in place designed to combat disinformation related to elections and other civic processes. These policies often work in tandem with the platforms\u2019 other policies, which address things like fraud, violent content, hate speech, and other content the platform may find objectionable. A piece of content may violate multiple policies at once, like a post advocating violence against a specific group.\r\n\r\nPlatform civic integrity policies primarily focus on prohibiting content that is misleading about how to participate in the civic process. This includes misleading statements or information about the official announced date or time of an election, misleading information about requirements to participate in an election, and content containing statements advocating for violence because of voting, voter registration, or the administration or outcome of an election.\r\n\r\nThese policies are not exhaustive though and have significant loopholes that allow for certain disinformation-oriented content to stay up on the platforms. This includes narratives contributing to voter suppression, disinformation from world leaders\/public figures, and political ads.\r\n\r\nWe summarize only the policies that Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube implemented during the 2020 elections and soon after. We also discuss how inconsistent enforcement and policy loopholes led to the spread of disinformation during and after the election, how the actions taken (or not taken) by the platforms contributed to the insurrection at the Capitol complex on January 6, and how the platforms reacted in the aftermath. Unfortunately, Facebook and Twitter have stopped enforcing existing policies to the degree they did during the 2020 election. Our research shows that there are many pieces of content being left on the platform that would have been taken down months ago.\r\n\r\n<strong>Facebook<\/strong>\r\n\r\nIt has been well documented that Facebook is inconsistent in its enforcement of existing policies. In September of 2020, the Wall Street Journal flagged over 200 pieces of content for Facebook that appeared to violate the platform\u2019s rules against the promotion of violence and dangerous information, only to have Facebook respond by taking down around 30 pieces of flagged content and later conceding that more than half of the pieces of content should have been taken down for violating their policies.\r\n\r\nIn addition to inconsistent enforcement, Facebook also had two major loopholes that contribute significantly to the spread of disinformation on the platform: the newsworthiness exemption and its policy of not fact-checking political ads. The newsworthiness exemption applies to any content that Facebook believes \u201cshould be seen and heard\u201d and meets a balancing test that weighs the public benefit of having the content up versus the harm keeping the content in question up could cause. This is extremely subjective, and this subjectivity is reflected in Facebook\u2019s use of the newsworthiness exemption over time.\r\n\r\nFacebook\u2019s decision to exempt political ads has proven to be equally controversial, if not more, than their newsworthiness exemption. This loophole is straightforward: Facebook will not fact-check political advertisements on the platform. During the 2020 election, then-candidate Donald Trump took advantage of this loophole several times and placed ads on Facebook intending to mislead voters about then-candidate Joe Biden and his son Hunter. If Facebook is to get serious about cracking down on disinformation, this loophole is one of the first they need to address. This laissez-faire approach to content moderation allowed bad actors to spread content that contributed to the January 6 insurrection.\r\n\r\n<strong>Gazouillement<\/strong>\r\n\r\nAlthough Facebook tends to dominate the conversation about content moderation practices and the spread of disinformation on social media, Twitter is guilty of many of the same things: inconsistent enforcement of existing policies, loopholes in policies that allow for the spread of disinformation, and relatively weak policy responses to the January 6 insurrection. While Twitter may want to be viewed as better on content moderation than its peers, it has been equally as slow to deal with the misinformation that is found all over the platform.\r\n\r\nJust like Facebook\u2019s newsworthiness exemption, Twitter has a major loophole that contributes significantly to the spread of disinformation called the \u201cpublic interest exception.\u201d This exception applies to tweets from elected and government officials that Twitter believes \u201cdirectly contribute\u201d to the understanding or discussion of a matter of public concern. Tweets that are found to be in the public interest but break other rules may have a label put on them but will not be taken down. Even though the platform insists that this does not mean public officials can post whatever they want (even tweets in violation of their rules), in reality, public officials are generally allowed to get away with posting whatever they want.\r\n\r\n<strong>YouTube <\/strong>\r\n\r\nPar rapport \u00e0 Facebook et Twitter, les politiques de YouTube n&#039;ont pas \u00e9t\u00e9 examin\u00e9es au m\u00eame degr\u00e9, mais comme les autres plateformes de m\u00e9dias sociaux mentionn\u00e9es ici, YouTube est \u00e9galement incoh\u00e9rent dans l&#039;application des politiques existantes. <strong>Cependant, au lieu d\u2019avoir une ou deux failles majeures dans lesquelles la d\u00e9sinformation peut se propager, les politiques de YouTube sont globalement beaucoup plus permissives que celles de Facebook et de Twitter.<\/strong>\r\n\r\nL&#039;incoh\u00e9rence de YouTube dans l&#039;application de ses politiques est bien document\u00e9e. En 2019, la plateforme a annonc\u00e9 qu&#039;elle modifierait sa politique sur les discours haineux et supprimerait des milliers de vid\u00e9os qui enfreignaient la nouvelle politique, mais Gizmodo a constat\u00e9 que de nombreuses vid\u00e9os \u00e9taient toujours en ligne. Pour couronner le tout, l&#039;algorithme de YouTube recommande fr\u00e9quemment des contenus qui enfreignent ses propres politiques."}},{"acf_fc_layout":"layout_wysiwyg","_acfe_flexible_toggle":"","component_wysiwyg":{"content":"<h2>Recommandations<\/h2>"}},{"acf_fc_layout":"layout_wysiwyg","_acfe_flexible_toggle":"","component_wysiwyg":{"content":"Les lois f\u00e9d\u00e9rales et celles de nombreux \u00c9tats contiennent des dispositions importantes pour r\u00e9duire l\u2019impact n\u00e9faste de la d\u00e9sinformation \u00e9lectorale. Les politiques d\u2019int\u00e9grit\u00e9 civique des entreprises de m\u00e9dias sociaux sont \u00e9galement d\u2019une importance cruciale. Ces lois et politiques actuelles laissent une grande marge d\u2019am\u00e9lioration. Il n\u2019existe pas de solution politique unique au probl\u00e8me de la d\u00e9sinformation \u00e9lectorale. Nous avons besoin de lois fortes sur le droit de vote, de lois fortes sur le financement des campagnes \u00e9lectorales, de lois fortes sur les communications et la confidentialit\u00e9, de lois fortes sur l\u2019\u00e9ducation aux m\u00e9dias et de politiques fortes sur l\u2019int\u00e9grit\u00e9 civique des entreprises. Dans la section 4 du rapport complet, nous recommandons des r\u00e9formes dans tous ces domaines politiques, en soulignant \u00e0 la fois les lois en attente qui devraient \u00eatre adopt\u00e9es et les lois nationales existantes qui devraient \u00eatre reproduites dans d\u2019autres juridictions."}},{"acf_fc_layout":"layout_wysiwyg","_acfe_flexible_toggle":"","component_wysiwyg":{"content":"<h2>Conclusion<\/h2>"}},{"acf_fc_layout":"layout_wysiwyg","_acfe_flexible_toggle":"","component_wysiwyg":{"content":"Depuis des d\u00e9cennies, le Common Cause Education Fund \u0153uvre \u00e0 l&#039;\u00e9ducation publique et aux r\u00e9formes syst\u00e9miques pour b\u00e2tir une meilleure d\u00e9mocratie. L&#039;impact n\u00e9faste de la d\u00e9sinformation \u00e9lectorale montre clairement que notre travail programmatique de base est plus que jamais n\u00e9cessaire. Nous devons et allons \u00e9duquer et mobiliser nos communaut\u00e9s pour freiner la croissance rapide et n\u00e9faste de la d\u00e9sinformation \u00e9lectorale. Cela contribuera \u00e0 tenir la promesse de l&#039;Am\u00e9rique d&#039;une d\u00e9mocratie fonctionnelle du XXIe si\u00e8cle, ouverte, accessible, r\u00e9active et responsable envers le peuple. Nous avons besoin de votre soutien et de votre activisme pour r\u00e9soudre le probl\u00e8me de la d\u00e9sinformation \u00e9lectorale. Ensemble, nous pouvons construire une d\u00e9mocratie qui fonctionne pour tout le monde."}},{"acf_fc_layout":"layout_wysiwyg","_acfe_flexible_toggle":"","component_wysiwyg":{"content":"<h2>Lire le rapport complet<\/h2>"}},{"acf_fc_layout":"layout_wysiwyg","_acfe_flexible_toggle":"","component_wysiwyg":{"content":"<a class=\"button1\" role=\"button\" target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.commoncause.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/10\/CC_AsaMatterofFact_FINAL_10.27.21.pdf\">En fait : le rapport sur les dommages caus\u00e9s par la d\u00e9sinformation \u00e9lectorale<\/a>"}},{"acf_fc_layout":"layout_add_component","_acfe_flexible_toggle":"","component_add_component":null},{"acf_fc_layout":"layout_work","_acfe_flexible_toggle":"","component_work":{"heading":"Work","manually_curate":false,"work":null}},{"acf_fc_layout":"layout_resources","_acfe_flexible_toggle":"","component_resources":{"heading":"Related Resources","button_text":"See all Related Resources","manually_curate":false,"resource":null}}]},"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO Premium plugin v26.6 (Yoast SEO v27.1.1) - 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