{"id":11972,"date":"2018-10-12T05:22:05","date_gmt":"2018-10-12T09:22:05","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.commoncause.org\/resources\/email-and-internet-voting-the-overlooked-threat-to-election-security\/"},"modified":"2024-06-13T19:58:41","modified_gmt":"2024-06-13T23:58:41","slug":"el-correo-electronico-y-la-votacion-por-internet-una-amenaza-olvidada-para-la-seguridad-electoral","status":"publish","type":"resource","link":"https:\/\/www.commoncause.org\/es\/resources\/email-and-internet-voting-the-overlooked-threat-to-election-security\/","title":{"rendered":"Votaci\u00f3n por correo electr\u00f3nico e Internet: la amenaza ignorada a la seguridad electoral"},"template":"","class_list":["post-11972","resource","type-resource","status-publish","hentry","resource_type-report"],"acf":{"details":{"summary":"Federal government, military and private sector studies have examined the feasibility of internet-based voting and have concluded it is not secure and should not be used in U.S. government elections.","featured_image":"","resource_type":150,"authors":"","related_issues":[143,2066],"related_work":false,"location":46},"sidebar":{"helper_enable_sidebar":false,"helper_media_contact":{"heading":"Media Contact","manually_enter_person":false,"person":"","name":"","role":"","phone":"","email":""},"helper_links_downloads":{"heading":"Links & Downloads","links":null}},"page_layout":[{"acf_fc_layout":"layout_wysiwyg","_acfe_flexible_toggle":"","component_wysiwyg":{"content":"read Download the Full Report: \" Email and Internet Voting: The Overlooked Threat to Election Security\"<\/a>"}},{"acf_fc_layout":"layout_wysiwyg","_acfe_flexible_toggle":"","component_wysiwyg":{"content":"

Resumen ejecutivo<\/span><\/h2>\r\nOver the past two years, revelations that our election systems have been targeted for cyberattack have roiled the U.S. Leaders of our national security apparatus have repeatedly warned that our election infrastructure continues to be targeted for online attacks by foreign intelligence. As state election officials grapple with the looming threat of cyberattack on election technology, there is a significant vulnerability that has been roundly ignored: transmission of ballots over the internet, including by email, fax and blockchain systems.\r\n\r\nThis report reviews the research that has been conducted by the federal government concluding that secure\r\nonline voting is not yet feasible. We examine the insoluble security problems that are inherent to casting ballots online, including server penetration attacks, client-device malware, attacks to emailed and faxed ballots in transit, denial-of-service attacks, disruption attacks and the challenge to reliably authenticate voters.\r\n\r\nThe report foregrounds a serious, yet widely overlooked cybersecurity threat to state and county election infrastructure that receive ballots sent as attachments in the form of emails or digital faxes. In jurisdictions that receive ballots by PDF or JPEG attachment, election workers must routinely click on documents from unknown sources to process emailed or faxed ballots, exposing the computer receiving the ballots \u2014 and any other devices on the same network \u2014 to a host of cyberattacks that could be launched from a false ballot laden with malicious software. An infected false ballot would enter the server like any other ballot, but once opened, it would download malware that could give attackers backdoor access to the elections office\u2019s network.\r\n\r\nA review of publications on security best practices from the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the National Association of Election Officials found no published guidance regarding the security of emailed ballots or recommendations for securing a computer terminal receiving emailed ballots.\r\n

Recomendaciones:<\/span><\/h3>\r\n