{"id":11937,"date":"2021-10-28T10:22:07","date_gmt":"2021-10-28T14:22:07","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.commoncause.org\/resources\/as-a-matter-of-fact-the-harms-caused-by-election-disinformation-report\/"},"modified":"2024-06-13T19:53:54","modified_gmt":"2024-06-13T23:53:54","slug":"de-hecho-los-danos-causados-por-el-informe-de-desinformacion-electoral","status":"publish","type":"resource","link":"https:\/\/www.commoncause.org\/es\/resources\/as-a-matter-of-fact-the-harms-caused-by-election-disinformation-report\/","title":{"rendered":"De hecho: los da\u00f1os causados por el informe de desinformaci\u00f3n electoral"},"template":"","class_list":["post-11937","resource","type-resource","status-publish","hentry","resource_type-report"],"acf":{"details":{"summary":"Donald Trump\u2019s Big Lie is working, and we have to respond. Just as we came together last year, rising up to vote safely and securely in record numbers during a global pandemic, we must now rise up to stop election disinformation efforts in future elections.","featured_image":"","resource_type":150,"authors":"","related_issues":[133,2065,2066,110],"related_work":false,"location":46},"sidebar":{"helper_enable_sidebar":false,"helper_media_contact":{"heading":"Media Contact","manually_enter_person":false,"person":"","name":"","role":"","phone":"","email":""},"helper_links_downloads":{"heading":"Links & Downloads","links":null}},"page_layout":[{"acf_fc_layout":"layout_wysiwyg","_acfe_flexible_toggle":"","component_wysiwyg":{"content":"<h2>Introducci\u00f3n<\/h2>"}},{"acf_fc_layout":"layout_wysiwyg","_acfe_flexible_toggle":"","component_wysiwyg":{"content":"<div class=\"page\" title=\"P\u00e1gina 7\">\r\n<div class=\"layoutArea\">\r\n<div class=\"column\">\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>En Estados Unidos, cualquiera que sea nuestro origen, color o c\u00f3digo postal, valoramos nuestra libertad.<\/strong> Generaci\u00f3n tras generaci\u00f3n hemos luchado por la libertad de tener voz y voto en las decisiones que afectan nuestras vidas, la libertad de participar plenamente en nuestro pa\u00eds. Pero en los \u00faltimos a\u00f1os, una peque\u00f1a facci\u00f3n se ha vuelto cada vez m\u00e1s h\u00e1bil en difundir mentiras sobre nuestras elecciones, mentiras que apuntaban a las comunidades negras y otras comunidades de color para suprimir sus votos. <strong>mentiras que alimentaron un ataque mortal a nuestro Capitolio en enero de 2021 para interrumpir la transferencia pac\u00edfica del poder, mentiras que amenazan con suprimir votos y socavar la confianza p\u00fablica en futuras elecciones.<\/strong> Este uso intencional de informaci\u00f3n falsa para afectar la participaci\u00f3n de los votantes en las elecciones se conoce como \u201cdesinformaci\u00f3n electoral\u201d.\r\n<blockquote>Estados Unidos se encuentra en una coyuntura cr\u00edtica. M\u00e1s de 1 de cada 3 residentes estadounidenses (y casi el 80% de los republicanos) creen err\u00f3neamente que el presidente Joe Biden no gan\u00f3 leg\u00edtimamente las elecciones.<\/blockquote>\r\nEstados Unidos se encuentra en una coyuntura cr\u00edtica. M\u00e1s de 1 de cada 3 residentes estadounidenses (y casi el 80% de los republicanos) creen err\u00f3neamente que el presidente Joe Biden no gan\u00f3 leg\u00edtimamente las elecciones, y una mayor\u00eda dice que \u201cno conf\u00eda en que las elecciones reflejen la voluntad del pueblo\u201d. <strong>La gran mentira de Donald Trump est\u00e1 funcionando y tenemos que responder a ella. As\u00ed como nos unimos el a\u00f1o pasado y nos pusimos de pie para votar de manera segura y protegida en cantidades r\u00e9cord durante una pandemia mundial, ahora debemos levantarnos para detener los intentos de desinformaci\u00f3n electoral en las pr\u00f3ximas elecciones.<\/strong> Este informe es un plan de juego para el \u00e9xito.\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<div class=\"layoutArea\">\r\n\r\nAs online election disinformation has increased, Common Cause Education Fund\u2019s commitment to monitoring and stopping it has likewise increased. As part of our plan to combat election disinformation, Common Cause Education Fund has prepared this report to explain the problem of election disinformation in detail and propose commonsense public and corporate policy reforms to reduce the harmful impacts of election disinformation in future elections. The report\u2019s final section is a series of state, federal and corporate reforms to help stem the flow of election disinformation that is undermining Americans' faith in the nation\u2019s elections. Reform recommendations detailed in the report include the following:\r\n<ul>\r\n \t<li><strong>Las empresas de redes sociales deben fortalecer sus pol\u00edticas para combatir el contenido dise\u00f1ado para socavar nuestra democracia<\/strong>, incluso proporcionando a los usuarios informaci\u00f3n fidedigna sobre votaciones y elecciones, reduciendo la difusi\u00f3n y amplificaci\u00f3n de la desinformaci\u00f3n electoral y proporcionando una mayor transparencia en cuanto a sus pol\u00edticas y pr\u00e1cticas de moderaci\u00f3n de contenidos.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>El Congreso y las legislaturas estatales deber\u00edan modificar las leyes sobre el derecho al voto para incluir expl\u00edcitamente <strong>Prohibir la difusi\u00f3n intencional de informaci\u00f3n falsa sobre la hora, el lugar o la forma de las elecciones. <\/strong>o las calificaciones o restricciones a la elegibilidad de los votantes, con la intenci\u00f3n de impedir la votaci\u00f3n.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>El Congreso y las legislaturas estatales deber\u00edan <strong>Actualizar las leyes de divulgaci\u00f3n de financiaci\u00f3n de campa\u00f1as para la era digital<\/strong>, para incluir <strong>&quot;<\/strong>pagado por\u201d exenciones de responsabilidad sobre publicidad digital y disposiciones efectivas que arrojan luz sobre el dinero transferido entre grupos para evadir la divulgaci\u00f3n.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>El Congreso y las legislaturas estatales deber\u00edan <strong>Aprobar una legislaci\u00f3n integral sobre privacidad de datos <\/strong>para proteger a los consumidores de la recopilaci\u00f3n, uso y compartici\u00f3n abusiva de datos personales.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>El Congreso deber\u00eda<strong> Promulgar leyes que fortalezcan los medios de comunicaci\u00f3n locales <\/strong>y proteger el acceso p\u00fablico a informaci\u00f3n de alta calidad sobre el gobierno, la seguridad p\u00fablica, la salud p\u00fablica, el desarrollo econ\u00f3mico y la cultura local.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>El Congreso deber\u00eda <strong>Aprobar una legislaci\u00f3n para proteger el acceso de los investigadores y periodistas de control a los datos de las redes sociales<\/strong>, lo que permite a los investigadores estudiar las pr\u00e1cticas de las plataformas de redes sociales sin temor a interferencias o represalias por parte de las empresas de redes sociales.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>El Congreso deber\u00eda <strong>Aprobar legislaci\u00f3n para prohibir los algoritmos discriminatorios de las plataformas en l\u00ednea<\/strong> y crear una mayor transparencia sobre c\u00f3mo funcionan estos algoritmos.<\/li>\r\n \t<li><strong>La Casa Blanca y los gobernadores de los estados de todo el pa\u00eds deben desempe\u00f1ar un papel de liderazgo en la lucha contra la desinformaci\u00f3n electoral.<\/strong>, incluso mediante la emisi\u00f3n de \u00f3rdenes ejecutivas que ordenan a las agencias con autoridad para hacer cumplir la ley, establecer normas e investigar que utilicen estas capacidades para combatir la desinformaci\u00f3n electoral.<\/li>\r\n<\/ul>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>"}},{"acf_fc_layout":"layout_wysiwyg","_acfe_flexible_toggle":"","component_wysiwyg":{"content":"<h2>Panorama de la desinformaci\u00f3n electoral<\/h2>"}},{"acf_fc_layout":"layout_wysiwyg","_acfe_flexible_toggle":"","component_wysiwyg":{"content":"<h2>\u00bfQu\u00e9 es la desinformaci\u00f3n electoral?<\/h2>\r\nEn t\u00e9rminos generales, la desinformaci\u00f3n electoral se refiere a los intentos intencionales de utilizar informaci\u00f3n falsa para afectar la participaci\u00f3n de los votantes en las elecciones. Existe una larga historia de t\u00e1cticas utilizadas para privar de sus derechos a los votantes, y nuestros informes anteriores11 detallan c\u00f3mo se utilizan volantes, vallas publicitarias y otras t\u00e1cticas fuera de l\u00ednea para dar a los votantes informaci\u00f3n incorrecta que podr\u00eda impedirles participar en una elecci\u00f3n. Estos informes tambi\u00e9n destacaron algunas de las t\u00e1cticas digitales emergentes en l\u00ednea utilizadas para difundir desinformaci\u00f3n electoral, incluido el correo electr\u00f3nico, la web y Facebook, que reci\u00e9n estaban ganando popularidad.\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>\u201cDesorden de informaci\u00f3n\u201d<\/strong> is an emerging term of art used by researchers and media experts that encompasses three related terms:\r\n\r\n\u2022 Disinformation is content that is false (even if it contains some truth) and deliberately created to harm a person, social group, organization, or country.\r\n\r\n\u2022 Misinformation is false information, but it is differentiated from disinformation by lacking an intent to harm any person, group, or organization.\r\n\r\n\u2022 Malinformation is content that is accurate but is intentionally manipulated to cause harm, including voter suppression or voter confusion.\r\n\r\n<strong>Desinformaci\u00f3n<\/strong>\r\n\r\nLa desinformaci\u00f3n es informaci\u00f3n falsa, pero se diferencia de la desinformaci\u00f3n en que no tiene la intenci\u00f3n de da\u00f1ar a ninguna persona, grupo u organizaci\u00f3n. Si bien es menos intencional, puede ser igualmente da\u00f1ina. Algunos ejemplos de desinformaci\u00f3n incluyen inexactitudes en fechas o estad\u00edsticas o pies de foto identificados incorrectamente. Cualquiera que se encuentre con la desinformaci\u00f3n podr\u00eda creerla y sacar conclusiones de ella, incluso si el proveedor de contenido no ten\u00eda la intenci\u00f3n de desinformarlo.\r\n\r\n<strong>Desinformaci\u00f3n <\/strong>\r\n\r\nEl contenido de desinformaci\u00f3n es falso y se crea deliberadamente para da\u00f1ar a una persona, un grupo social, una organizaci\u00f3n o un pa\u00eds. La desinformaci\u00f3n se difunde deliberada y a menudo de forma encubierta para influir en la opini\u00f3n y las acciones p\u00fablicas, ocultar o alterar las votaciones o generar motivos de indignaci\u00f3n. La desinformaci\u00f3n puede contener algunos hechos verdaderos, pero esos hechos se sacan de contexto o se combinan con falsedades para crear y respaldar un mensaje espec\u00edfico.\r\n\r\n<strong>Desinformaci\u00f3n <\/strong>\r\n\r\nLa desinformaci\u00f3n es contenido que es preciso pero que se manipula intencionalmente para causar da\u00f1o. Esto incluye la tergiversaci\u00f3n del contexto de una noticia verdadera, la divulgaci\u00f3n de informaci\u00f3n personal (como direcciones y n\u00fameros de tel\u00e9fono de una persona en l\u00ednea para intimidarla) o la filtraci\u00f3n selectiva de correspondencia.\r\n\r\n<strong>\u00bfQui\u00e9n est\u00e1 difundiendo desinformaci\u00f3n electoral y por qu\u00e9? <\/strong>\r\n\r\nFew who intentionally spread election disinformation would publicize this fact because the behavior is sometimes illegal and always despicable. The ability of individuals to anonymously spread election disinformation is part of the problem\u2014and strengthening transparency laws as recommended later in this report is part of the solution. Nevertheless, here is what we know about those spreading election disinformation in recent years. Both foreign and domestic actors have used\u2014and likely will continue to use\u2014election disinformation. During the 2016 elections, the Russian Internet Research Agency created numerous posts on multiple social media platforms. According to the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, this foreign interference was \u201cat the direction of the Kremlin\u201d and created social media content in support of then-candidate Trump and against Hillary Clinton. In particular, the content was \u201cprincipally aimed at African-Americans in key metropolitan areas.\u201d Russian disinformation efforts included the use of the Facebook page Blacktivist, which purported to be a Black empowerment page and garnered 11.2 million engagements with Facebook users. Both advertisement and organic (non-ad) content was published through this program. This Russian social media content was designed to drive divisions between voters and cause general political instability in the United States, a tactic that differed from more direct efforts to disenfranchise voters used by some other purveyors of election disinformation.\r\n\r\nA number of social scientists are working to understand the psychology behind individuals spreading disinformation. In our observations, gleaned from over 15,000 volunteer hours spent monitoring social media for mis- and disinformation during the 2020 election cycle, we have found that election misinformation is often spread by those sincerely attempting to be helpful in a climate of uncertainty and distrust (particularly when it came to the USPS and its ability to manage vote by mail in the 2020 elections) and disinformation is spread by individuals with partisan goals, including intraparty contests, like the Democratic Presidential Primary.\r\n\r\nIn an age of hyperpartisanship, spreading election disinformation can both serve to attack your political opponents and show that you are aligned with other members of your political tribe. Election disinformation\u2014in particular, the narrative of a rigged election and pervasive voter fraud committed by Democrats\u2014existed long before the rise of Donald Trump but now has become party orthodoxy. You can signal that you are a Trump-supporting \u201cMAGA Republican\u201d (an acronym for Trump\u2019s campaign slogan \u201cMake America Great Again\u201d) by spreading stories that reinforce a narrative (however false) about a political system rigged against other MAGA Republicans. This creates a negative feedback loop of distrust in government and elections: a September 2021 poll showed that 78% of Republicans believe that Joe Biden did not win the presidency. Numerous states and counties are proceeding with sham ballot reviews\u2014even in areas where Trump won decisively. Among 15 Republican candidates currently running for secretary of state in five battleground states, 10 have \u201ceither declared that the 2020 election was stolen or called for their state\u2019s results to be invalidated or further investigated.\u201d <strong>La desinformaci\u00f3n electoral es difundida por activistas y candidatos de la misma manera que sol\u00edan hacerlo los mensajes pol\u00edticos y las prioridades tem\u00e1ticas.<\/strong>"}},{"acf_fc_layout":"layout_wysiwyg","_acfe_flexible_toggle":"","component_wysiwyg":{"content":"<h2>Leyes estatales y federales que regulan la desinformaci\u00f3n electoral<\/h2>"}},{"acf_fc_layout":"layout_wysiwyg","_acfe_flexible_toggle":"","component_wysiwyg":{"content":"Several different bodies of law provide tools for fighting election disinformation. A primary purpose of election disinformation is to suppress and sometimes intimidate voters. Consequently, election laws prohibiting voter intimidation and false election speech play an important role in fighting election disinformation. Several other bodies of law are also critically important to the fight. Strong campaign finance disclosure laws can shine the light of publicity on those seeking to undermine our elections from the shadows and help ensure existing laws are enforced. Communications laws, consumer protection laws, media literacy laws, and privacy laws can all play a part in effectively regulating and deterring election disinformation.\r\n\r\n<strong>Voter Intimidation and False Election Speech Laws <\/strong>\r\n\r\nFederal law and laws in nearly every state contain provisions explicitly prohibiting voter intimidation, with many of these laws being rightly interpreted as prohibiting election disinformation. Some states have enacted laws explicitly prohibiting various types of false election-related speech\u2014e.g., false statements about voting procedures\/qualifications, candidates, incumbency, endorsements, veteran status, or ballot measure effects. In this report, we focus only on the first of these types: laws prohibiting false statements about voting procedures and qualifications such as where and when to vote. Our reasons are twofold and related to one another. First, the veracity of statements about voting procedures and qualifications (e.g., the date of the election, the hours polls are open) is easily ascertainable, and determining such veracity can be done in an entirely nonpartisan, objective fashion. By contrast, determining the veracity of statements about a candidate (e.g., a candidate\u2019s stance on an issue) is often more subjective, as reflected by the rating systems some prominent fact-checkers use.\r\n\r\nSecond, and relatedly, courts have for years been divided on the constitutionality of laws prohibiting false speech characterizing candidates and ballot measures, with at least two federal appellate courts in recent years striking down such laws as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Courts are much more likely to uphold as constitutionally permissible narrower laws prohibiting false statements about the procedures and qualifications of voting.\r\n\r\n<em><strong>Federal Voter Intimidation and False Election Speech Laws<\/strong><\/em>\r\n\r\nThe following is a summary of voter intimidation and false speech laws at the federal level and in numerous states. And the recommendations section at the end of this report identifies the best features of these laws, urging their adoption throughout the United States.\r\n\r\n<strong>The National Voter Registration Act of 1993<\/strong> makes it a crime to knowingly and willfully intimidate or threaten any person for voting, registering to vote, or aiding others to register and vote. Another federal criminal statute similarly provides that \u201c[w]hoever intimidates, threatens, coerces, or attempts to intimidate, threaten, or coerce, any other person for the purpose of interfering with the right of such other person to vote\u201d in a federal election has committed a crime subject to fines or imprisonment. The DOJ explains that this statute \u201ccriminalizes conduct intended to force prospective voters to vote against their preferences, or refrain from voting, through activity reasonably calculated to instill some form of fear.\u201d Conspiracy to \u201cinjure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person\u2026in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States\u201d\u2014 including the right to vote\u2014is a felony under federal law. This criminal code provision covers voter suppression schemes, including \u201cproviding false information to the public\u2014or a particular segment of the public\u2014regarding the qualifications to vote, the consequences of voting in connection with citizenship status, the dates or qualifications for absentee voting, the date of an election, the hours for voting, or the correct voting precinct.\r\n\r\nIn addition to the federal criminal code provisions detailed in the preceding paragraphs, the <strong>Voting Rights Act of 1965 and other civil rights law<\/strong><strong>s<\/strong><strong>\u00a0<\/strong>also prohibit disinformation activities that amount to voter intimidation or suppression. The Voting Rights Act provides that no person \u201cshall intimidate, threaten, or coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any person for voting or attempting to vote.\u201d\r\n\r\n<em><strong>State Voter Intimidation and False Election Speech Laws<\/strong><\/em>\r\n\r\nThe federal laws detailed earlier prohibiting voter intimidation and suppression\u2014including some disinformation tactics\u2014generally apply to any election with candidates for federal office on the ballot. Nearly every state, likewise, has laws prohibiting voter intimidation and suppression, applicable to elections even when no federal office candidates are on the ballot. A few states have laws explicitly regulating false election-related speech, and a few others have interpreted more general anti-intimidation laws to prohibit false election speech. APPENDIX I in the report summarizes the voter intimidation and false speech laws of several states. Among the best state laws worthy of emulating around the nation, Colorado law provides that no person shall knowingly or recklessly \u201cmake, publish, broadcast, or circulate or cause to be made, published, broadcasted, or circulated\u2026any false statement designed to affect the vote on any issue submitted to the electors at any election or relating to any candidate for election to public office.\u201d The Colorado attorney general\u2019s guidance makes clear that disinformation tactics\u2014including \u201cmisleading phone calls, texts, or emails to a voter\u201d\u2014can constitute illegal voter intimidation.\u201d Similarly, Hawaii law provides that any person who \u201cknowingly broadcasts, televises, circulates, publishes, distributes, or otherwise communicates\u2026false information about the time, date, place, or means of voting with the purpose of impeding, preventing, or otherwise interfering with the free exercise of the elective franchise\u201d has committed illegal election fraud. And Virginia explicitly outlaws communicating to a \u201cregistered voter, by any means, false information, knowing the same to be false, intended to impede the voter in the exercise of his right to vote,\u201d including information \u201cabout the date, time, and place of the election, or the voter\u2019s precinct, polling place, or voter registration status, or the location of a voter satellite office or the office of the general registrar.\u201d Importantly, Virginia law includes a private right of action for registered voters to whom such false information is communicated, enabling them to seek an \u201cinjunction, restraining order, or other order, against the person communicating such false information.\u201d\r\n\r\nFor an overview of Campaign Finance Laws, Federal Communications Laws, Federal Consumer Protection Laws, State Media Literacy laws, and State Privacy Laws, read Section 2 of the full report."}},{"acf_fc_layout":"layout_wysiwyg","_acfe_flexible_toggle":"","component_wysiwyg":{"content":"<h2>Seleccione Pol\u00edticas de Integridad C\u00edvica en las Redes Sociales<\/h2>"}},{"acf_fc_layout":"layout_wysiwyg","_acfe_flexible_toggle":"","component_wysiwyg":{"content":"Social media platforms from Facebook to Twitter and YouTube to TikTok have civic integrity policies in place designed to combat disinformation related to elections and other civic processes. These policies often work in tandem with the platforms\u2019 other policies, which address things like fraud, violent content, hate speech, and other content the platform may find objectionable. A piece of content may violate multiple policies at once, like a post advocating violence against a specific group.\r\n\r\nPlatform civic integrity policies primarily focus on prohibiting content that is misleading about how to participate in the civic process. This includes misleading statements or information about the official announced date or time of an election, misleading information about requirements to participate in an election, and content containing statements advocating for violence because of voting, voter registration, or the administration or outcome of an election.\r\n\r\nThese policies are not exhaustive though and have significant loopholes that allow for certain disinformation-oriented content to stay up on the platforms. This includes narratives contributing to voter suppression, disinformation from world leaders\/public figures, and political ads.\r\n\r\nWe summarize only the policies that Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube implemented during the 2020 elections and soon after. We also discuss how inconsistent enforcement and policy loopholes led to the spread of disinformation during and after the election, how the actions taken (or not taken) by the platforms contributed to the insurrection at the Capitol complex on January 6, and how the platforms reacted in the aftermath. Unfortunately, Facebook and Twitter have stopped enforcing existing policies to the degree they did during the 2020 election. Our research shows that there are many pieces of content being left on the platform that would have been taken down months ago.\r\n\r\n<strong>Facebook<\/strong>\r\n\r\nIt has been well documented that Facebook is inconsistent in its enforcement of existing policies. In September of 2020, the Wall Street Journal flagged over 200 pieces of content for Facebook that appeared to violate the platform\u2019s rules against the promotion of violence and dangerous information, only to have Facebook respond by taking down around 30 pieces of flagged content and later conceding that more than half of the pieces of content should have been taken down for violating their policies.\r\n\r\nIn addition to inconsistent enforcement, Facebook also had two major loopholes that contribute significantly to the spread of disinformation on the platform: the newsworthiness exemption and its policy of not fact-checking political ads. The newsworthiness exemption applies to any content that Facebook believes \u201cshould be seen and heard\u201d and meets a balancing test that weighs the public benefit of having the content up versus the harm keeping the content in question up could cause. This is extremely subjective, and this subjectivity is reflected in Facebook\u2019s use of the newsworthiness exemption over time.\r\n\r\nFacebook\u2019s decision to exempt political ads has proven to be equally controversial, if not more, than their newsworthiness exemption. This loophole is straightforward: Facebook will not fact-check political advertisements on the platform. During the 2020 election, then-candidate Donald Trump took advantage of this loophole several times and placed ads on Facebook intending to mislead voters about then-candidate Joe Biden and his son Hunter. If Facebook is to get serious about cracking down on disinformation, this loophole is one of the first they need to address. This laissez-faire approach to content moderation allowed bad actors to spread content that contributed to the January 6 insurrection.\r\n\r\n<strong>Gorjeo<\/strong>\r\n\r\nAlthough Facebook tends to dominate the conversation about content moderation practices and the spread of disinformation on social media, Twitter is guilty of many of the same things: inconsistent enforcement of existing policies, loopholes in policies that allow for the spread of disinformation, and relatively weak policy responses to the January 6 insurrection. While Twitter may want to be viewed as better on content moderation than its peers, it has been equally as slow to deal with the misinformation that is found all over the platform.\r\n\r\nJust like Facebook\u2019s newsworthiness exemption, Twitter has a major loophole that contributes significantly to the spread of disinformation called the \u201cpublic interest exception.\u201d This exception applies to tweets from elected and government officials that Twitter believes \u201cdirectly contribute\u201d to the understanding or discussion of a matter of public concern. Tweets that are found to be in the public interest but break other rules may have a label put on them but will not be taken down. Even though the platform insists that this does not mean public officials can post whatever they want (even tweets in violation of their rules), in reality, public officials are generally allowed to get away with posting whatever they want.\r\n\r\n<strong>YouTube <\/strong>\r\n\r\nEn comparaci\u00f3n con Facebook y Twitter, las pol\u00edticas de YouTube no han sido examinadas con el mismo grado, pero al igual que las otras plataformas de redes sociales mencionadas aqu\u00ed, YouTube tambi\u00e9n es inconsistente en la aplicaci\u00f3n de las pol\u00edticas existentes. <strong>Sin embargo, en lugar de tener una o dos lagunas importantes en las que la desinformaci\u00f3n puede propagarse, las pol\u00edticas de YouTube son, en general, mucho m\u00e1s permisivas que las de Facebook y Twitter.<\/strong>\r\n\r\nLa falta de coherencia de YouTube en la aplicaci\u00f3n de sus pol\u00edticas est\u00e1 bien documentada. En 2019, la plataforma anunci\u00f3 que har\u00eda cambios en su pol\u00edtica sobre incitaci\u00f3n al odio y eliminar\u00eda miles de v\u00eddeos que infring\u00edan la nueva pol\u00edtica, pero Gizmodo descubri\u00f3 que muchos de los v\u00eddeos segu\u00edan colgados. Para empeorar las cosas, el propio algoritmo de YouTube suele recomendar contenido que infringe sus propias pol\u00edticas."}},{"acf_fc_layout":"layout_wysiwyg","_acfe_flexible_toggle":"","component_wysiwyg":{"content":"<h2>Recomendaciones<\/h2>"}},{"acf_fc_layout":"layout_wysiwyg","_acfe_flexible_toggle":"","component_wysiwyg":{"content":"Las leyes federales y las leyes de muchos estados contienen disposiciones importantes para reducir el impacto nocivo de la desinformaci\u00f3n electoral. Las pol\u00edticas de integridad c\u00edvica de las empresas de redes sociales tambi\u00e9n son de vital importancia. Estas leyes y pol\u00edticas actuales dejan mucho margen de mejora. No existe una \u00fanica soluci\u00f3n pol\u00edtica para el problema de la desinformaci\u00f3n electoral. Necesitamos leyes s\u00f3lidas sobre el derecho al voto, leyes s\u00f3lidas sobre financiaci\u00f3n de campa\u00f1as, leyes s\u00f3lidas sobre comunicaciones y privacidad, leyes s\u00f3lidas sobre alfabetizaci\u00f3n medi\u00e1tica y pol\u00edticas s\u00f3lidas de integridad c\u00edvica corporativa. En la Secci\u00f3n 4 del informe completo, recomendamos reformas en todas estas \u00e1reas de pol\u00edticas, destacando tanto la legislaci\u00f3n pendiente que deber\u00eda aprobarse como las leyes estatales existentes que deber\u00edan replicarse en otras jurisdicciones."}},{"acf_fc_layout":"layout_wysiwyg","_acfe_flexible_toggle":"","component_wysiwyg":{"content":"<h2>Conclusi\u00f3n<\/h2>"}},{"acf_fc_layout":"layout_wysiwyg","_acfe_flexible_toggle":"","component_wysiwyg":{"content":"Durante d\u00e9cadas, Common Cause Education Fund ha trabajado en la educaci\u00f3n p\u00fablica y en reformas sist\u00e9micas para construir una mejor democracia. El impacto nocivo de la desinformaci\u00f3n electoral deja en claro que nuestro trabajo program\u00e1tico central es necesario ahora m\u00e1s que nunca. Debemos educar y movilizar a nuestras comunidades para frenar el crecimiento r\u00e1pido y da\u00f1ino de la desinformaci\u00f3n electoral. Hacerlo ayudar\u00e1 a cumplir la promesa de Estados Unidos de una democracia funcional del siglo XXI que sea abierta, accesible, receptiva y responsable ante el pueblo. Necesitamos su apoyo y su activismo para solucionar el problema de la desinformaci\u00f3n electoral. Juntos, podemos construir una democracia que funcione para todos."}},{"acf_fc_layout":"layout_wysiwyg","_acfe_flexible_toggle":"","component_wysiwyg":{"content":"<h2>Lea el informe completo<\/h2>"}},{"acf_fc_layout":"layout_wysiwyg","_acfe_flexible_toggle":"","component_wysiwyg":{"content":"<a class=\"button1\" role=\"button\" target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.commoncause.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/10\/CC_AsaMatterofFact_FINAL_10.27.21.pdf\">De hecho: los da\u00f1os causados por el informe de desinformaci\u00f3n electoral<\/a>"}},{"acf_fc_layout":"layout_add_component","_acfe_flexible_toggle":"","component_add_component":null},{"acf_fc_layout":"layout_work","_acfe_flexible_toggle":"","component_work":{"heading":"Work","manually_curate":false,"work":null}},{"acf_fc_layout":"layout_resources","_acfe_flexible_toggle":"","component_resources":{"heading":"Related Resources","button_text":"See all Related Resources","manually_curate":false,"resource":null}}]},"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO Premium plugin v26.6 (Yoast SEO v27.1.1) - 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