{"id":11937,"date":"2021-10-28T10:22:07","date_gmt":"2021-10-28T14:22:07","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.commoncause.org\/resources\/as-a-matter-of-fact-the-harms-caused-by-election-disinformation-report\/"},"modified":"2024-06-13T19:53:54","modified_gmt":"2024-06-13T23:53:54","slug":"tatsachlich-sind-die-schaden-die-durch-den-bericht-uber-desinformation-bei-wahlen-verursacht-werden","status":"publish","type":"resource","link":"https:\/\/www.commoncause.org\/de\/resources\/as-a-matter-of-fact-the-harms-caused-by-election-disinformation-report\/","title":{"rendered":"Tats\u00e4chlich: Der Schaden, der durch den Bericht \u00fcber Desinformation bei den Wahlen verursacht wurde"},"template":"","class_list":["post-11937","resource","type-resource","status-publish","hentry","resource_type-report"],"acf":{"details":{"summary":"Donald Trump\u2019s Big Lie is working, and we have to respond. Just as we came together last year, rising up to vote safely and securely in record numbers during a global pandemic, we must now rise up to stop election disinformation efforts in future elections.","featured_image":"","resource_type":150,"authors":"","related_issues":[133,2065,2066,110],"related_work":false,"location":46},"sidebar":{"helper_enable_sidebar":false,"helper_media_contact":{"heading":"Media Contact","manually_enter_person":false,"person":"","name":"","role":"","phone":"","email":""},"helper_links_downloads":{"heading":"Links & Downloads","links":null}},"page_layout":[{"acf_fc_layout":"layout_wysiwyg","_acfe_flexible_toggle":"","component_wysiwyg":{"content":"<h2>Einf\u00fchrung<\/h2>"}},{"acf_fc_layout":"layout_wysiwyg","_acfe_flexible_toggle":"","component_wysiwyg":{"content":"<div class=\"page\" title=\"Seite 7\">\r\n<div class=\"layoutArea\">\r\n<div class=\"column\">\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>In Amerika sch\u00e4tzen wir unsere Freiheit, unabh\u00e4ngig von unserer Herkunft, Hautfarbe oder Postleitzahl.<\/strong> Generation um Generation hat f\u00fcr die Freiheit gek\u00e4mpft, bei Entscheidungen, die unser Leben beeinflussen, mitreden zu d\u00fcrfen \u2013 f\u00fcr die Freiheit, in unserem Land voll und ganz mitzuwirken. Doch in den letzten Jahren ist eine kleine Fraktion immer geschickter darin geworden, L\u00fcgen \u00fcber unsere Wahlen zu verbreiten, L\u00fcgen, die sich gegen schwarze und andere farbige Gemeinschaften richteten, um ihre Stimmen zu unterdr\u00fccken. <strong>L\u00fcgen, die einen t\u00f6dlichen Angriff auf unser Kapitol im Januar 2021 befeuerten, um die friedliche Macht\u00fcbergabe zu st\u00f6ren; L\u00fcgen, die die W\u00e4hlerstimmen zu unterdr\u00fccken drohen und das Vertrauen der \u00d6ffentlichkeit in k\u00fcnftige Wahlen untergraben.<\/strong> Dieser vors\u00e4tzliche Einsatz falscher Informationen, um die Wahlbeteiligung der W\u00e4hler zu beeinflussen, wird als \u201eWahldesinformation\u201c bezeichnet.\r\n<blockquote>Die Vereinigten Staaten befinden sich an einem kritischen Punkt. Mehr als jeder dritte US-B\u00fcrger \u2013 und fast 801 Prozent der Republikaner \u2013 glauben f\u00e4lschlicherweise, dass Pr\u00e4sident Joe Biden die Wahl nicht rechtm\u00e4\u00dfig gewonnen hat.<\/blockquote>\r\nDie Vereinigten Staaten befinden sich an einem kritischen Punkt. Mehr als jeder dritte US-B\u00fcrger \u2013 und fast 801 Prozent der Republikaner \u2013 glauben f\u00e4lschlicherweise, dass Pr\u00e4sident Joe Biden die Wahl nicht rechtm\u00e4\u00dfig gewonnen hat, und eine Mehrheit sagt, sie habe \u201ekein Vertrauen darin, dass die Wahlen den Willen des Volkes widerspiegeln\u201c. <strong>Donald Trumps gro\u00dfe L\u00fcge funktioniert, und wir m\u00fcssen darauf reagieren. So wie wir uns letztes Jahr zusammengefunden haben, um w\u00e4hrend einer globalen Pandemie in Rekordzahlen sicher und gesch\u00fctzt w\u00e4hlen zu gehen, m\u00fcssen wir uns jetzt erheben, um Desinformationskampagnen bei zuk\u00fcnftigen Wahlen zu stoppen.<\/strong> Dieser Bericht ist ein Spielplan f\u00fcr den Erfolg.\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<div class=\"layoutArea\">\r\n\r\nAs online election disinformation has increased, Common Cause Education Fund\u2019s commitment to monitoring and stopping it has likewise increased. As part of our plan to combat election disinformation, Common Cause Education Fund has prepared this report to explain the problem of election disinformation in detail and propose commonsense public and corporate policy reforms to reduce the harmful impacts of election disinformation in future elections. The report\u2019s final section is a series of state, federal and corporate reforms to help stem the flow of election disinformation that is undermining Americans' faith in the nation\u2019s elections. Reform recommendations detailed in the report include the following:\r\n<ul>\r\n \t<li><strong>Social-Media-Unternehmen m\u00fcssen ihre Ma\u00dfnahmen zur Bek\u00e4mpfung von Inhalten, die unsere Demokratie untergraben sollen, versch\u00e4rfen<\/strong>, indem sie den Nutzern verl\u00e4ssliche Informationen zu Abstimmungen und Wahlen zur Verf\u00fcgung stellen, die Verbreitung und Verst\u00e4rkung von Falschinformationen zu Wahlen eind\u00e4mmen und f\u00fcr mehr Transparenz hinsichtlich ihrer Richtlinien und Praktiken zur Inhaltsmoderation sorgen.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Der Kongress und die Parlamente der Bundesstaaten sollten die Wahlrechtsgesetze dahingehend \u00e4ndern, dass sie ausdr\u00fccklich <strong>Verbot der absichtlichen Verbreitung falscher Informationen \u00fcber Zeitpunkt, Ort oder Art von Wahlen <\/strong>oder die Voraussetzungen oder Einschr\u00e4nkungen der Wahlberechtigung mit der Absicht, die Stimmabgabe zu behindern.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Der Kongress und die Parlamente der Bundesstaaten sollten <strong>Aktualisierung der Offenlegungsgesetze f\u00fcr Wahlkampffinanzierungen im digitalen Zeitalter<\/strong>, einschlie\u00dflich <strong>\u201e<\/strong>Es gibt Haftungsausschl\u00fcsse f\u00fcr \u201ebezahlt von\u201c in der digitalen Werbung sowie wirksame Bestimmungen, die Licht auf Geld werfen, das zwischen Gruppen transferiert wird, um einer Offenlegung zu entgehen.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Der Kongress und die Parlamente der Bundesstaaten sollten <strong>Verabschiedung umfassender Datenschutzgesetze <\/strong>um Verbraucher vor der missbr\u00e4uchlichen Erfassung, Verwendung und Weitergabe personenbezogener Daten zu sch\u00fctzen.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Der Kongress sollte<strong> Gesetze zur St\u00e4rkung der lokalen Medien erlassen <\/strong>und den \u00f6ffentlichen Zugang zu qualitativ hochwertigen Informationen \u00fcber Regierung, \u00f6ffentliche Sicherheit, \u00f6ffentliche Gesundheit, wirtschaftliche Entwicklung und lokale Kultur zu sch\u00fctzen.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Der Kongress sollte <strong>Gesetze zu verabschieden, die Forschern und Journalisten den Zugriff auf Social-Media-Daten erm\u00f6glichen<\/strong>, sodass Forscher die Praktiken von Social-Media-Plattformen untersuchen k\u00f6nnen, ohne Einmischung oder Vergeltungsma\u00dfnahmen von Social-Media-Unternehmen bef\u00fcrchten zu m\u00fcssen.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Der Kongress sollte <strong>Verabschiedung eines Gesetzes zum Verbot diskriminierender Algorithmen auf Online-Plattformen<\/strong> und mehr Transparenz \u00fcber die Funktionsweise dieser Algorithmen zu schaffen.<\/li>\r\n \t<li><strong>Das Wei\u00dfe Haus und die Gouverneure der Bundesstaaten m\u00fcssen eine f\u00fchrende Rolle bei der Bek\u00e4mpfung von Wahldesinformation spielen.<\/strong>, unter anderem durch die Ver\u00f6ffentlichung von Durchf\u00fchrungsverordnungen, mit denen Beh\u00f6rden mit Durchsetzungs-, Regelsetzungs- und Ermittlungsbefugnissen angewiesen werden, diese F\u00e4higkeiten im Kampf gegen Wahldesinformation einzusetzen.<\/li>\r\n<\/ul>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>"}},{"acf_fc_layout":"layout_wysiwyg","_acfe_flexible_toggle":"","component_wysiwyg":{"content":"<h2>\u00dcberblick \u00fcber Desinformation zur Wahl<\/h2>"}},{"acf_fc_layout":"layout_wysiwyg","_acfe_flexible_toggle":"","component_wysiwyg":{"content":"<h2>Was ist Wahldesinformation?<\/h2>\r\nIm weitesten Sinne bezieht sich Wahldesinformation auf gezielte Versuche, falsche Informationen zu verwenden, um die Wahlbeteiligung von W\u00e4hlern zu beeinflussen. Es gibt eine lange Geschichte von Taktiken, die verwendet werden, um W\u00e4hler zu entm\u00fcndigen, und unsere fr\u00fcheren Berichte11 beschreiben detailliert, wie Flyer, Plakatw\u00e4nde und andere Offline-Taktiken verwendet werden, um W\u00e4hler mit falschen Informationen zu versorgen, die sie von der Wahlteilnahme abhalten k\u00f6nnten. Diese Berichte beleuchteten auch einige der neuen digitalen Online-Taktiken, die verwendet werden, um Wahldesinformation zu verbreiten, darunter E-Mail, das Internet und Facebook, die gerade erst an Popularit\u00e4t gewannen.\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>\u201eInformationsst\u00f6rung\u201c<\/strong> is an emerging term of art used by researchers and media experts that encompasses three related terms:\r\n\r\n\u2022 Disinformation is content that is false (even if it contains some truth) and deliberately created to harm a person, social group, organization, or country.\r\n\r\n\u2022 Misinformation is false information, but it is differentiated from disinformation by lacking an intent to harm any person, group, or organization.\r\n\r\n\u2022 Malinformation is content that is accurate but is intentionally manipulated to cause harm, including voter suppression or voter confusion.\r\n\r\n<strong>Falsche Informationen<\/strong>\r\n\r\nFalsche Informationen sind falsche Informationen, unterscheiden sich jedoch von Desinformationen dadurch, dass sie nicht die Absicht haben, einer Person, Gruppe oder Organisation zu schaden. Obwohl sie weniger absichtlich sind, k\u00f6nnen sie genauso sch\u00e4dlich sein. Beispiele f\u00fcr Falschinformationen sind ungenaue Daten oder Statistiken oder falsch identifizierte Bildunterschriften. Jeder, der auf Falschinformationen st\u00f6\u00dft, k\u00f6nnte sie glauben und daraus Schlussfolgerungen ziehen, selbst wenn der Inhaltsanbieter nicht beabsichtigt hat, ihn falsch zu informieren.\r\n\r\n<strong>Desinformation <\/strong>\r\n\r\nDesinformationsinhalte sind falsch und werden absichtlich geschaffen, um einer Person, einer sozialen Gruppe, einer Organisation oder einem Land zu schaden. Desinformation wird absichtlich und oft verdeckt verbreitet, um die \u00f6ffentliche Meinung und Handlungen zu beeinflussen, Wahlergebnisse zu verschleiern oder zu manipulieren oder Anlass zur Emp\u00f6rung zu geben. Desinformation kann einige wahre Fakten enthalten, aber diese Fakten werden entweder aus dem Kontext gerissen oder mit Unwahrheiten kombiniert, um eine bestimmte beabsichtigte Botschaft zu erstellen und zu unterst\u00fctzen.\r\n\r\n<strong>Falsche Informationen <\/strong>\r\n\r\nFalschinformationen sind Inhalte, die zwar richtig sind, aber absichtlich manipuliert werden, um Schaden anzurichten. Dazu geh\u00f6ren die falsche Darstellung des Kontexts einer wahren Nachricht, Doxing (die Ver\u00f6ffentlichung pers\u00f6nlicher Informationen wie Adressen und Telefonnummern einer Person im Internet, um sie einzusch\u00fcchtern) oder das selektive Durchsickern von Korrespondenz.\r\n\r\n<strong>Wer verbreitet Falschinformationen zur Wahl und warum? <\/strong>\r\n\r\nFew who intentionally spread election disinformation would publicize this fact because the behavior is sometimes illegal and always despicable. The ability of individuals to anonymously spread election disinformation is part of the problem\u2014and strengthening transparency laws as recommended later in this report is part of the solution. Nevertheless, here is what we know about those spreading election disinformation in recent years. Both foreign and domestic actors have used\u2014and likely will continue to use\u2014election disinformation. During the 2016 elections, the Russian Internet Research Agency created numerous posts on multiple social media platforms. According to the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, this foreign interference was \u201cat the direction of the Kremlin\u201d and created social media content in support of then-candidate Trump and against Hillary Clinton. In particular, the content was \u201cprincipally aimed at African-Americans in key metropolitan areas.\u201d Russian disinformation efforts included the use of the Facebook page Blacktivist, which purported to be a Black empowerment page and garnered 11.2 million engagements with Facebook users. Both advertisement and organic (non-ad) content was published through this program. This Russian social media content was designed to drive divisions between voters and cause general political instability in the United States, a tactic that differed from more direct efforts to disenfranchise voters used by some other purveyors of election disinformation.\r\n\r\nA number of social scientists are working to understand the psychology behind individuals spreading disinformation. In our observations, gleaned from over 15,000 volunteer hours spent monitoring social media for mis- and disinformation during the 2020 election cycle, we have found that election misinformation is often spread by those sincerely attempting to be helpful in a climate of uncertainty and distrust (particularly when it came to the USPS and its ability to manage vote by mail in the 2020 elections) and disinformation is spread by individuals with partisan goals, including intraparty contests, like the Democratic Presidential Primary.\r\n\r\nIn an age of hyperpartisanship, spreading election disinformation can both serve to attack your political opponents and show that you are aligned with other members of your political tribe. Election disinformation\u2014in particular, the narrative of a rigged election and pervasive voter fraud committed by Democrats\u2014existed long before the rise of Donald Trump but now has become party orthodoxy. You can signal that you are a Trump-supporting \u201cMAGA Republican\u201d (an acronym for Trump\u2019s campaign slogan \u201cMake America Great Again\u201d) by spreading stories that reinforce a narrative (however false) about a political system rigged against other MAGA Republicans. This creates a negative feedback loop of distrust in government and elections: a September 2021 poll showed that 78% of Republicans believe that Joe Biden did not win the presidency. Numerous states and counties are proceeding with sham ballot reviews\u2014even in areas where Trump won decisively. Among 15 Republican candidates currently running for secretary of state in five battleground states, 10 have \u201ceither declared that the 2020 election was stolen or called for their state\u2019s results to be invalidated or further investigated.\u201d <strong>Aktivisten und Kandidaten verbreiten Desinformation \u00fcber die Wahlen auf die gleiche Weise wie fr\u00fcher politische Botschaften und Themenpriorit\u00e4ten.<\/strong>"}},{"acf_fc_layout":"layout_wysiwyg","_acfe_flexible_toggle":"","component_wysiwyg":{"content":"<h2>Staatliche und bundesstaatliche Gesetze zur Regulierung von Falschinformationen \u00fcber Wahlen<\/h2>"}},{"acf_fc_layout":"layout_wysiwyg","_acfe_flexible_toggle":"","component_wysiwyg":{"content":"Several different bodies of law provide tools for fighting election disinformation. A primary purpose of election disinformation is to suppress and sometimes intimidate voters. Consequently, election laws prohibiting voter intimidation and false election speech play an important role in fighting election disinformation. Several other bodies of law are also critically important to the fight. Strong campaign finance disclosure laws can shine the light of publicity on those seeking to undermine our elections from the shadows and help ensure existing laws are enforced. Communications laws, consumer protection laws, media literacy laws, and privacy laws can all play a part in effectively regulating and deterring election disinformation.\r\n\r\n<strong>Voter Intimidation and False Election Speech Laws <\/strong>\r\n\r\nFederal law and laws in nearly every state contain provisions explicitly prohibiting voter intimidation, with many of these laws being rightly interpreted as prohibiting election disinformation. Some states have enacted laws explicitly prohibiting various types of false election-related speech\u2014e.g., false statements about voting procedures\/qualifications, candidates, incumbency, endorsements, veteran status, or ballot measure effects. In this report, we focus only on the first of these types: laws prohibiting false statements about voting procedures and qualifications such as where and when to vote. Our reasons are twofold and related to one another. First, the veracity of statements about voting procedures and qualifications (e.g., the date of the election, the hours polls are open) is easily ascertainable, and determining such veracity can be done in an entirely nonpartisan, objective fashion. By contrast, determining the veracity of statements about a candidate (e.g., a candidate\u2019s stance on an issue) is often more subjective, as reflected by the rating systems some prominent fact-checkers use.\r\n\r\nSecond, and relatedly, courts have for years been divided on the constitutionality of laws prohibiting false speech characterizing candidates and ballot measures, with at least two federal appellate courts in recent years striking down such laws as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Courts are much more likely to uphold as constitutionally permissible narrower laws prohibiting false statements about the procedures and qualifications of voting.\r\n\r\n<em><strong>Federal Voter Intimidation and False Election Speech Laws<\/strong><\/em>\r\n\r\nThe following is a summary of voter intimidation and false speech laws at the federal level and in numerous states. And the recommendations section at the end of this report identifies the best features of these laws, urging their adoption throughout the United States.\r\n\r\n<strong>The National Voter Registration Act of 1993<\/strong> makes it a crime to knowingly and willfully intimidate or threaten any person for voting, registering to vote, or aiding others to register and vote. Another federal criminal statute similarly provides that \u201c[w]hoever intimidates, threatens, coerces, or attempts to intimidate, threaten, or coerce, any other person for the purpose of interfering with the right of such other person to vote\u201d in a federal election has committed a crime subject to fines or imprisonment. The DOJ explains that this statute \u201ccriminalizes conduct intended to force prospective voters to vote against their preferences, or refrain from voting, through activity reasonably calculated to instill some form of fear.\u201d Conspiracy to \u201cinjure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person\u2026in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States\u201d\u2014 including the right to vote\u2014is a felony under federal law. This criminal code provision covers voter suppression schemes, including \u201cproviding false information to the public\u2014or a particular segment of the public\u2014regarding the qualifications to vote, the consequences of voting in connection with citizenship status, the dates or qualifications for absentee voting, the date of an election, the hours for voting, or the correct voting precinct.\r\n\r\nIn addition to the federal criminal code provisions detailed in the preceding paragraphs, the <strong>Voting Rights Act of 1965 and other civil rights law<\/strong><strong>s<\/strong><strong>\u00a0<\/strong>also prohibit disinformation activities that amount to voter intimidation or suppression. The Voting Rights Act provides that no person \u201cshall intimidate, threaten, or coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any person for voting or attempting to vote.\u201d\r\n\r\n<em><strong>State Voter Intimidation and False Election Speech Laws<\/strong><\/em>\r\n\r\nThe federal laws detailed earlier prohibiting voter intimidation and suppression\u2014including some disinformation tactics\u2014generally apply to any election with candidates for federal office on the ballot. Nearly every state, likewise, has laws prohibiting voter intimidation and suppression, applicable to elections even when no federal office candidates are on the ballot. A few states have laws explicitly regulating false election-related speech, and a few others have interpreted more general anti-intimidation laws to prohibit false election speech. APPENDIX I in the report summarizes the voter intimidation and false speech laws of several states. Among the best state laws worthy of emulating around the nation, Colorado law provides that no person shall knowingly or recklessly \u201cmake, publish, broadcast, or circulate or cause to be made, published, broadcasted, or circulated\u2026any false statement designed to affect the vote on any issue submitted to the electors at any election or relating to any candidate for election to public office.\u201d The Colorado attorney general\u2019s guidance makes clear that disinformation tactics\u2014including \u201cmisleading phone calls, texts, or emails to a voter\u201d\u2014can constitute illegal voter intimidation.\u201d Similarly, Hawaii law provides that any person who \u201cknowingly broadcasts, televises, circulates, publishes, distributes, or otherwise communicates\u2026false information about the time, date, place, or means of voting with the purpose of impeding, preventing, or otherwise interfering with the free exercise of the elective franchise\u201d has committed illegal election fraud. And Virginia explicitly outlaws communicating to a \u201cregistered voter, by any means, false information, knowing the same to be false, intended to impede the voter in the exercise of his right to vote,\u201d including information \u201cabout the date, time, and place of the election, or the voter\u2019s precinct, polling place, or voter registration status, or the location of a voter satellite office or the office of the general registrar.\u201d Importantly, Virginia law includes a private right of action for registered voters to whom such false information is communicated, enabling them to seek an \u201cinjunction, restraining order, or other order, against the person communicating such false information.\u201d\r\n\r\nFor an overview of Campaign Finance Laws, Federal Communications Laws, Federal Consumer Protection Laws, State Media Literacy laws, and State Privacy Laws, read Section 2 of the full report."}},{"acf_fc_layout":"layout_wysiwyg","_acfe_flexible_toggle":"","component_wysiwyg":{"content":"<h2>Ausgew\u00e4hlte Richtlinien zur gesellschaftlichen Integrit\u00e4t in sozialen Medien<\/h2>"}},{"acf_fc_layout":"layout_wysiwyg","_acfe_flexible_toggle":"","component_wysiwyg":{"content":"Social media platforms from Facebook to Twitter and YouTube to TikTok have civic integrity policies in place designed to combat disinformation related to elections and other civic processes. These policies often work in tandem with the platforms\u2019 other policies, which address things like fraud, violent content, hate speech, and other content the platform may find objectionable. A piece of content may violate multiple policies at once, like a post advocating violence against a specific group.\r\n\r\nPlatform civic integrity policies primarily focus on prohibiting content that is misleading about how to participate in the civic process. This includes misleading statements or information about the official announced date or time of an election, misleading information about requirements to participate in an election, and content containing statements advocating for violence because of voting, voter registration, or the administration or outcome of an election.\r\n\r\nThese policies are not exhaustive though and have significant loopholes that allow for certain disinformation-oriented content to stay up on the platforms. This includes narratives contributing to voter suppression, disinformation from world leaders\/public figures, and political ads.\r\n\r\nWe summarize only the policies that Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube implemented during the 2020 elections and soon after. We also discuss how inconsistent enforcement and policy loopholes led to the spread of disinformation during and after the election, how the actions taken (or not taken) by the platforms contributed to the insurrection at the Capitol complex on January 6, and how the platforms reacted in the aftermath. Unfortunately, Facebook and Twitter have stopped enforcing existing policies to the degree they did during the 2020 election. Our research shows that there are many pieces of content being left on the platform that would have been taken down months ago.\r\n\r\n<strong>auf facebook.<\/strong>\r\n\r\nIt has been well documented that Facebook is inconsistent in its enforcement of existing policies. In September of 2020, the Wall Street Journal flagged over 200 pieces of content for Facebook that appeared to violate the platform\u2019s rules against the promotion of violence and dangerous information, only to have Facebook respond by taking down around 30 pieces of flagged content and later conceding that more than half of the pieces of content should have been taken down for violating their policies.\r\n\r\nIn addition to inconsistent enforcement, Facebook also had two major loopholes that contribute significantly to the spread of disinformation on the platform: the newsworthiness exemption and its policy of not fact-checking political ads. The newsworthiness exemption applies to any content that Facebook believes \u201cshould be seen and heard\u201d and meets a balancing test that weighs the public benefit of having the content up versus the harm keeping the content in question up could cause. This is extremely subjective, and this subjectivity is reflected in Facebook\u2019s use of the newsworthiness exemption over time.\r\n\r\nFacebook\u2019s decision to exempt political ads has proven to be equally controversial, if not more, than their newsworthiness exemption. This loophole is straightforward: Facebook will not fact-check political advertisements on the platform. During the 2020 election, then-candidate Donald Trump took advantage of this loophole several times and placed ads on Facebook intending to mislead voters about then-candidate Joe Biden and his son Hunter. If Facebook is to get serious about cracking down on disinformation, this loophole is one of the first they need to address. This laissez-faire approach to content moderation allowed bad actors to spread content that contributed to the January 6 insurrection.\r\n\r\n<strong>\u00dej\u00f3rs\u00e1rden<\/strong>\r\n\r\nAlthough Facebook tends to dominate the conversation about content moderation practices and the spread of disinformation on social media, Twitter is guilty of many of the same things: inconsistent enforcement of existing policies, loopholes in policies that allow for the spread of disinformation, and relatively weak policy responses to the January 6 insurrection. While Twitter may want to be viewed as better on content moderation than its peers, it has been equally as slow to deal with the misinformation that is found all over the platform.\r\n\r\nJust like Facebook\u2019s newsworthiness exemption, Twitter has a major loophole that contributes significantly to the spread of disinformation called the \u201cpublic interest exception.\u201d This exception applies to tweets from elected and government officials that Twitter believes \u201cdirectly contribute\u201d to the understanding or discussion of a matter of public concern. Tweets that are found to be in the public interest but break other rules may have a label put on them but will not be taken down. Even though the platform insists that this does not mean public officials can post whatever they want (even tweets in violation of their rules), in reality, public officials are generally allowed to get away with posting whatever they want.\r\n\r\n<strong>YouTube <\/strong>\r\n\r\nIm Vergleich zu Facebook und Twitter werden die Richtlinien von YouTube nicht im gleichen Ma\u00dfe \u00fcberpr\u00fcft. Doch wie bei den anderen hier erw\u00e4hnten Social-Media-Plattformen ist auch YouTube bei der Durchsetzung bestehender Richtlinien inkonsequent. <strong>Doch statt ein oder zwei gro\u00dfe Schlupfl\u00f6cher zu haben, durch die sich Falschinformationen verbreiten k\u00f6nnten, sind die Richtlinien von YouTube insgesamt viel freiz\u00fcgiger als die von Facebook und Twitter.<\/strong>\r\n\r\nDie Inkonsistenz von YouTube bei der Durchsetzung seiner Richtlinien ist gut dokumentiert. Im Jahr 2019 k\u00fcndigte die Plattform an, dass sie ihre Hassrede-Richtlinien \u00e4ndern und Tausende von Videos entfernen werde, die gegen die neuen Richtlinien versto\u00dfen. Gizmodo stellte jedoch fest, dass viele der Videos weiterhin online waren. Um die Sache noch schlimmer zu machen, empfiehlt YouTubes eigener Algorithmus h\u00e4ufig Inhalte, die gegen seine eigenen Richtlinien versto\u00dfen."}},{"acf_fc_layout":"layout_wysiwyg","_acfe_flexible_toggle":"","component_wysiwyg":{"content":"<h2>Empfehlungen<\/h2>"}},{"acf_fc_layout":"layout_wysiwyg","_acfe_flexible_toggle":"","component_wysiwyg":{"content":"Bundesgesetze und die Gesetze vieler Bundesstaaten enthalten wichtige Bestimmungen, um die sch\u00e4dlichen Auswirkungen von Wahldesinformation zu reduzieren. Richtlinien zur gesellschaftlichen Integrit\u00e4t von Social-Media-Unternehmen sind ebenso von entscheidender Bedeutung. Diese aktuellen Gesetze und Richtlinien lassen viel Raum f\u00fcr Verbesserungen. Es gibt keine einheitliche politische L\u00f6sung f\u00fcr das Problem der Wahldesinformation. Wir brauchen strenge Wahlrechtsgesetze, strenge Gesetze zur Wahlkampffinanzierung, strenge Kommunikations- und Datenschutzgesetze, strenge Gesetze zur Medienkompetenz und strenge Richtlinien zur gesellschaftlichen Integrit\u00e4t von Unternehmen. In Abschnitt 4 des vollst\u00e4ndigen Berichts empfehlen wir Reformen in all diesen Politikbereichen und heben sowohl anstehende Gesetze hervor, die verabschiedet werden sollten, als auch bestehende Gesetze der Bundesstaaten, die in anderen Rechtsr\u00e4umen \u00fcbernommen werden sollten."}},{"acf_fc_layout":"layout_wysiwyg","_acfe_flexible_toggle":"","component_wysiwyg":{"content":"<h2>Abschluss<\/h2>"}},{"acf_fc_layout":"layout_wysiwyg","_acfe_flexible_toggle":"","component_wysiwyg":{"content":"Der Common Cause Education Fund arbeitet seit Jahrzehnten an der \u00f6ffentlichen Bildung und an systemischen Reformen, um eine bessere Demokratie aufzubauen. Die sch\u00e4dlichen Auswirkungen von Wahldesinformation machen deutlich, dass unsere grundlegende Programmarbeit heute mehr denn je ben\u00f6tigt wird. Wir m\u00fcssen und werden unsere Gemeinden aufkl\u00e4ren und mobilisieren, um das sch\u00e4dliche, schnelle Wachstum der Wahldesinformation einzud\u00e4mmen. Auf diese Weise k\u00f6nnen wir Amerikas Versprechen einer funktionierenden Demokratie des 21. Jahrhunderts erf\u00fcllen, die offen, zug\u00e4nglich, reaktionsf\u00e4hig und dem Volk gegen\u00fcber rechenschaftspflichtig ist. Wir brauchen Ihre Unterst\u00fctzung und Ihren Aktivismus, um das Problem der Wahldesinformation zu l\u00f6sen. Gemeinsam k\u00f6nnen wir eine Demokratie aufbauen, die f\u00fcr alle funktioniert."}},{"acf_fc_layout":"layout_wysiwyg","_acfe_flexible_toggle":"","component_wysiwyg":{"content":"<h2>Lesen Sie den vollst\u00e4ndigen Bericht<\/h2>"}},{"acf_fc_layout":"layout_wysiwyg","_acfe_flexible_toggle":"","component_wysiwyg":{"content":"<a class=\"button1\" role=\"button\" target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.commoncause.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/10\/CC_AsaMatterofFact_FINAL_10.27.21.pdf\">Tats\u00e4chlich: Der Schaden, der durch den Bericht \u00fcber Desinformation bei den Wahlen verursacht wurde<\/a>"}},{"acf_fc_layout":"layout_add_component","_acfe_flexible_toggle":"","component_add_component":null},{"acf_fc_layout":"layout_work","_acfe_flexible_toggle":"","component_work":{"heading":"Work","manually_curate":false,"work":null}},{"acf_fc_layout":"layout_resources","_acfe_flexible_toggle":"","component_resources":{"heading":"Related Resources","button_text":"See all Related Resources","manually_curate":false,"resource":null}}]},"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO Premium plugin v26.6 (Yoast SEO v27.1.1) - 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