Electronic Voting Machines
Common Cause has been working on the issue of electronic voting machines as part of our campaign to increase electoral integrity. The most basic of all democratic principles is that all eligible votes are counted. 
The nation must fix the machinery of voting; all voters in all jurisdictions across the country should have reasonable confidence that their votes will be counted accurately. In the November 2006 election, more than one-third of the states used paperless electronic voting machines, which have been shown to be unreliable and insecure. Elections officials need to step back and take another look at what is the best technology for voting. In addition, any voting system must ensure that disabled voters can vote privately and independently, in compliance with the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002.
Electronic voting machines are based on software that is, by its nature complex and essentially invisible to those overseeing it. Further, the machines, especially if not carefully tested and safeguarded, are vulnerable to malicious and nearly undetectable changes in the software. That is why it is important to have the assurance of a voter-verified paper ballot that can be audited.
What is a "voter verified paper ballot" (VVPB)? This phrase, or variations of it, describes a voting system that allows voters to confirm that their votes are recorded as they intended and that elections officials have a clear confirmation of the voters' intent for counts, audits, and recounts. Such systems include electronic voting machines with the capacity for printing out a ballot and precinct-based optical scan systems, which allow a voter to mark a paper ballot and then scan it into a counter.
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Electronic voting machines need a voter-verified paper audit trail. Touch screen machines that do not have paper trails should be replaced or fitted with printers that can produce a voter-verified paper ballot.
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All systems need better testing, maintenance, and independent certification. All systems must be auditable, and audits must be mandatory and random. A statistically significant percentage of machines should be audited in each election.
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The process for testing and certification must be open, and computer security experts should be allowed access to the voting machine computer codes to strengthen the security of the systems and prevent tampering.
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We must ensure that the National Institute for Standards and Technology has sufficient funding for setting standards for certification of voting systems.
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There must be strict conflict-of-interest and nonpartisan guidelines for both elections officials and the companies who sell voting equipment, including voting machines and voter database systems
For answers to common questions, please see our frequently asked questions (FAQs) section.
Read former Common Cause President Chellie Pingree's testimony before the U.S. Election Assistance Commission.
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